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THESIS 
ABSTRACT 
Seventy four Christian tertiary students were presented with six 
hypothetical life event descriptions and asked to imagine that 
these events were happening to them. Subjects then listed any 
thoughts that went through their minds as they faced the events. 
Spontaneous attributions to God and the Devil were produced by 
some of the sample. Spontaneous attributions to God's hand, 
God's will and God's general control were strongly related to 
the importance of religion and prayer. These attributions 
appeared to provide meaning and comfort, especially for those 
confronted with serious health problems. This study supports 
the view that God attribution is an important part of people's 
religious belief and meaning system, but casts doubt on the view 
that God image plays a significant role in determining the 
situations where God attributions occur. 
An attempt was made to test the validity of the forced choice 
method traditionally used to scale religious attributions. The 
patterns of spontaneous and forced choice religious attributions 
were similar across the different situations, yet attribution to 
religious sources was significantly greater using the forced 
choice method. It is concluded that the forced choice method 
tends to elicit reactive measures, and that the richness and 
spontaneity of the thought listing responses provides a more 
accurate picture of people's spontaneous religious attributions. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The bel f that specific events in one's life have religious 
causes plays an important part in the lives of some people. 
Those who view God as active in one's life may frequently 
attribute specific and personal events to Him. On recovery from 
a physical ailment, they may credit God with the healing 
process, thus linking Him causally to the recovery. This is an 
attribution to God since God is considered as causing the 
recovery (an event) . They may also attribute events in their 
lives to other religious causes, such as Jesus, the Devil, 
angels, religious faith, or even church teachings. 
Only in the 1980's have religious attributions been 
empirically investigated. A few researchers into the psychology 
of religion have applied concepts and methods of attribution 
theory to a study of God attributions (Spilka and Schmidt 1983; 
Spilka, Shaver and Kirkpatrick 1985; Proudfoot and Shaver 1975; 
Ritzema 1979; Gorsuch and Schmidt 1983; Brown 1984; Pargament 
and Hahn 1986) . 
Attribution theory in the 1970's had become the dominant 
cognitive approach in social psychology (Ross and Fletcher 
1985) . It is an approach that contains research findings and 
theoretical models that explain how and why people link causes 
to events. 
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The application of attribution theory to the psychological 
study of religion has attempted to provide an integrative 
theoretical and methodological framework for the psychology of 
religion (Spilka, Shaver and Kirkpatrick 1985) . Fruitful avenues 
for future research follow from the religious attribution 
approach (Spilka, Hood and Gorsuch 1985) Because such an 
approach is very recent, research has concentrated upon 
attributions to God amongst Christians. 
Progress has been made in the identification of the 
situations that tend to produce God attributions (Spilka and 
Schmidt 1983; Pargament and Hahn 1986; Ritzema 1979) . Further 
work has pointed to God attribution as being an important 
component of religiosity, religious meaning-belief systems, and 
of coping strategies (Ritzema 1979; Gorsuch and Smith 1983; 
Brown 1984; Pargament and Hahn 1986). 
Desp these major advances, the methodology used in those 
studies rna~ have been too direct to capture subjects' 
spontaneous attributions. There is a distinct possibility that 
the forced choice method traditionally used to elicit causal 
attributions from subjects does not give a true picture of 
subjects' spontaneous attributions. The more indirect 
spontaneous thought listing probe (Weiner 1985) captures 
subjects attributions that occur spontaneously when thinking 
about an event and it is used in this thesis to investigate 
religious attributions amongst a Christian sample. 
The examination of the characteristics of spontaneous 
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attributions to God and to the Devil in response to hypothetical 
life events are central themes in the present study. The type 
of events that produce spontaneous religious attributions and 
the importance of religious belief and meaning system components 
(God image, prayer and meaning and comfort provided by God) 
are also themes dealt with in this thesis. 
The literature review starts by outlining the history and 
nature of the psychological study of religion, and the religious 
attribution approach is placed in broad historical perspective. 
The literature review then covers research that is specifically 
relevant to this thesis. Aims and hypotheses are developed from 
the review and presented in section 2.3 
Chapter 3 outlines the sampling, method and coding 
procedures, while chapter 4 gives a summary of results. The 
discussion section then follows: it explains the most relevant 
results and discusses the methodological implications of the 
findings. 
3 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Psychology of Religion 
2.1.1 Historical trends 
Pioneers in the field of psychology of religion published 
works around the 1890's - early 1900's. These early enthusiasts 
were Americans who made popular the study of religious 
conversion, and religion in adolescence. G.S. Hall, Leuba, and 
Starbuck conducted empirical research in these areas. Possibly 
the most influential pioneer was William James who embraced 
empirical methods of investigation (Flakoll 1977) within his 
primarily phenomenological conceptual framework (Dittes 1977) . 
James' perspective is illustrated in the publication of his most 
influential book; "The Varieties of Religious Experience" 
(1902) . He popularised and diversified topics of research to 
include ecstasy, prayer, religion and mental health, and 
mysticism (Flakoll 1977}. 
As the topics of study diversified so did the methods used 
to investigate them. Even so, much of the early material was 
anecdotal and concerned with self documentation (Beit-Hallahmi 
1977). James was interested in the individual's experience and 
thus used biographical data and self reports in his idiographic 
approach to studying the psychology of religion. It should be 
noted that in contrast to the idiographic mode most research is 
based on the nomothetic approach, which allows the 
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generalisation of principles governing human behavior and 
experience (Capps 1977). The history of methods used in the 
psychological study of religion is reviewed by Flakoll (1977), 
who notes twenty different techniques including, the self 
report, introspection, observation, survey, tests and scales. 
Surprisingly there have been virtually no experiments or 
quasi-experiments conducted in the field since its beginnings 
(Batson 1979). This lack of experimentation has almost 
definitely weakened theory testing in the field of psychology 
and religion, according to Batson ( 197 9); Yeats and Asher 
(1979). In fact the period 1900- 1960 has been noted as being 
dominated by the questionnaire " of the comparatively 
unsophisticated pencil and paper variety" (Flakoll 1977, p.89). 
The early 1900's witnessed the beginnings of the 
psychological and empirical approach to religion, but the period 
from 1930-50 is generally recognised as a period of decline. 
The factors that have contributed to the declining number of 
publications are discussed in a number of reviews (e.g., Beit 
Hallahmi 1977; Strunk 1977; Scobie 1977). One major problem was 
that research was not based on an integrative theoretical 
foundation, and so findings had limited explanatory value. This 
lack of a suitable paradigm, or approach to investigation may 
have also retarded development in the ld in more recent times 
according to Beit-Hallahmi (1977) . Interestingly, the period of 
decl referred to is not noted by Strunk (1977), who saw many 
pioneers as being overly positivistic and reductionist in any 
case. Strunk sees a hope for the psychology of religion in the 
integration of many disciplines, where a humanistic perspective 
that captures the richness of. the religious spirit is at the 
core. 
2. 1. 2 Towards the Contemporary Empirical Approach 
"Has the phoenix risen from the ashes of the early 
studies in the psychology of religion?" 
Scobie (1977) . 
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From 1950 onwards a revitalisation of interest has been 
sparked by theoretical progress in the study of religiosity, 
religion and prejudice (see Allport and Ross 1967; King and 
Hunt 1975) . The attribution approach to the psychological study 
of religion developed by Spilka, Shaver andf Kirkpatrick (1985) 
has also provided a theoretical paradigm that is encouraging 
much empirical research (see Spilka. Hood and Gorsuch 1985) . 
Since 1950 the number of articles and texts published on the 
psychology of religion has ipcreased at a rapid rate. This has 
been especially true for the American literature. Francis (1978 
and 1981) does not see a rebirth, but instead sees a revival of 
interest that is not yet founded on sound multidisciplinary 
knowledge. His point is that researchers in the psychology of 
religion need a better understanding of both theology and 
psychology. Capps, Rannsohoff and Rambo ( 197 6) reviewed 
publication trends to 1974. They devised a six dimensional 
classification schema where coders identified each of 2727 
publications as belonging to either the "mythological, ritual, 
experiential, dispositional, social, or directional" dimensions. 
Their results clearly indicate that up to 1974, interest in the 
directional and dispositional dimensions has far outstripped 
interest in other areas. That is, religion and mental health, 
7 
self concepts, religious attitudes, cognitive and moral 
development have received the most attention. Capps et al 
conclude that most researchers do not "demonstrate a working 
fami rity with more than one research area.". Quite possibly 
the lack of intradisciplinary integration has stifled attempts 
to construct the broadly based theoretical framework that Strunk 
(1977) and Francis (1978) call for in their quest for a 
progressive psychological study of religion. 
Warren ( 1977) notes an important advancement made from 
1960-70 in the definition of religion. The treatment of 
religion as multidimensional provides a more sophisticated 
approach to the measurement of religiosity (religious 
commitment) than the traditional unidimensional measures. 
Frequency of church attendance is an example of a unidimensional 
measure. 
A number of dimension schemas have been devised: (e.g.) 
Davidson 1985; King and Hunt 1969; Hilty and Morgan 1985; Roof 
1979; Cornwall et al 1986. These religiosity dimensions have 
largely been based upon intuition, observation and factor 
analysis. Many religiosity scales have been developed from such 
dimensions which are typically suited to the paper and pencil 
questionnaire and correlation analysis. Roof (1979) states; 
"Morton King and Richard Hunt (1967); (1969); 
(1972); (1975) have engaged in unquestionably the 
most comprehensive sustained effort to date to 
test the multidimensional hypothesis" 
They found good evidence for specific religious dimensions, and 
created a battery of scales to measure a person's religiosity. 
A very similar set of scales was developed by Hilty and Morgan 
(1985) giving further support to the multidimensional model as a 
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measurement frame-work, and as a way to conceive one's religion. 
Along with multidimensionality, Gordon Allport's 
"intrinsic-extrinsic" typology (Allport and Ross 1967) has 
stimulated substantial research and discussion. Allport was 
interested in the relationship between prejudiced attitudes and 
personal religion. He distinguished two types of religious 
people; the intrinsics and the extrinsics. Later he 
distinguished a third type; the "indiscriminately pro-religious 
(neither extrinsically nor intrinsically religious) and a fourth 
type the "indiscrimately anti-religious (i.e. non religious}. 
According to Allport, extrinsic people use religion to satisfy 
their own goals,whereas intrinsics "live" their religion. These 
types then, represent different motivational orientations to 
religion. Recently Allport's typology has come under critical 
review. Dittes (1977) criticised the concepts as containing 
unnecessary value judgements. Secondly, the intrinsic sea 
tends to be specific to the denomination of the subject (Donohue 
1985a}. There are also doubts about the clarity of the 
extrinsic-intrinsic concepts and as Kahoe (1985) notes these 
concepts are not bipolar, Batson and Ventis (1982}; Hunt and 
King (1977) question whether intrinsic religious motivation is 
as pure as it seems. These criticisms do not provide 
insurmountable problems for intrinsic-entrinsic researchers 
(Donohue 1985b), and Hood (1985} even claims that Allport's 
typology provides the only consistent theoretical integration in 
the psychology of religion. Allen and Spilka (1967) employed a 
similar two fold typology but differentiated people in terms of 
the way they think about religion (their cognitive style) . 
"Consensual religion" is based upon a closed cognitive style 
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where concrete and tangible thoughts pervade, while "commited 
religion" is based on an open style of thinking where abstract 
and relational concepts tend to be used. It is not certain 
whether Allen and Spilka's typology measures the same variable 
Allport's intrinsic-extrinsic model according to Spilka Hood and 
Gorsuch (1985) . 
In summary, from 1950 onwards both the multidimensional, 
and extrinsic-extrinsic approach to the psychology of religion 
has encouraged and shaped an empirical approach that is rapidly 
becoming popular. (Spilka, Hood and Gorsuch 1985). 
2.2 Attribytions to God and the Deyil: an Integration of 
Attribution Theory and the Psychology of Religion 
2. 2.1 Attribution theory: A brief Introduction 
Attribution theory is not a single theory but is rather a 
collection of theories and re.search findings that attempt to 
describe and explain the characteristics of causal attribution. 
According to Ross and Fletcher (1985) a causal attribution is a 
cognition where an event is linked to its cause. It is a 
person's perception or inference of a cause (Kelly and Michela 
1980, p.457). For example, a person who states; "John caused 
the accident", is attributing the accident to John. 
Usually researchers are interested in the layperson's 
attributions, within a social context. Attribution theory 
became the dominant cognitive approach in social psychology in 
the 1970's (Ross and Fletcher 1985). Some of the questions 
attribution theorists have asked are: how, and under what 
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circumstances do people make attributions?; what motivates 
people to make at tr ibut ions?; what factors account for 
attributional bias? and; what types of attribution are there? 
Heider (1958) provided the initial theoretical impetus for 
further study into the layperson's "naive psychology". He 
believed that people (like psychologists) attempt to understand 
the behaviour of themselves and others in their day to day life. 
Kelley (1967) diversified the focus of research by postulating 
that people attempt to test the validity of their attributions 
by analysing "consensus", "consistency", and "distinctiveness" 
information. Further attribution models have been introduced by 
a number of theorists including Jones and Davis (1965), Jones 
and Nisbett (1972) and Weiner et al (1972) . Ross and Fletcher 
(1985) provide a review of the major attribution models. 
2.2.2 Methodology for religious attribution research 
The methods used for the study of religious attributions 
have followed the traditional methods taken by many attribution 
researchers to obtain and analyse subjects' attributions. 
The method most commonly used to investigate task oriented 
attributions has been to present the subject with a list of 
about five possible causes for an event or outcome. The subject 
is asked to rate the extent each cause is responsible for the 
event or outcome. Pargament et al (1982); Weiner et al (1972); 
Feather and Simon (1970) all employ this method. Nearly all the 
causal attribution to God literature uses this closed scale 
method to determine when people attribute events to God. 
Furthermore, attributions to God have rarely been studied in 
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real fe settings. Instead, the scenario methodology has been 
the tool used to 'create' situat Several hypothetical 
situations are presented to the subjects, and characteristics of 
the situation are manipulated in the vignettes. The situations 
described have generally been events that may not happen in a 
person's life, but would carry significant consequences for any 
person, e.g. an illness, or a change from depression to 
happiness or a win in a major lottery (see Spilka and Schmidt 
1983; Gorsuch and Smith 1983; Spilka, Shaver and Kirkpatrick 
1985) . The subject then provided with a list of about five 
possible causes for the outcome of the event and is asked to 
rate the extent they think each cause is responsible for the 
outcome. The scenario methodology relies on the abi of the 
subject to imagine a hypothetical situation and then to 
cognitively react as if it were real. The external validity of 
this method is not yet known but a comparison with attributions 
in real life (e.g., Bulman and Wortman 1977; Kroll-Smith and 
Couch 1987) could provide a test. 
Causal categories the subjects have been asked to rate for 
God attribution studies have been; "chance" or "luck"; "fate"; 
"self'; "powerful others"; "systems"; "God"; "God's will"; 
"God's anger"; "God's love"; and "the Devil". The method 
outlined above is one method used in the present study to scale 
attributions to God and the Devil. The general criticism of the 
causal scale rating method is that they give rise to reactive 
measures which do not capture natural or spontaneous 
attributions (Weiner 1975) . Thus, another method that captures 
subjects spontaneous attributions to God or the Devil is also 
used in the present invwstigation. 
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2.2.3 Spontaneous Attributions 
It is ironic that only after much study investigating the 
causes that people attribute to actions or events the question 
is asked: Do people naturally and spontaneously engage in a 
significant amount of attributional activity? (Ross and 
Fletcher 1985; Kelly and Michela 1980) . The importance of much 
attributional theory hangs on the answer. With the aid of 
spontaneous attribution methods, researchers have found strong 
empirical evidence that a great deal of attributional activity 
occurs in a variety of situations (Wong and Weiner 1981; Lau 
and Russell 1980; Wortman and Dintzer 1978; Deiner and Dweck 
1978) (see Weiner 1985 for a literature review) . 
Methods used to study spontaneous attributions in task 
oriented situations have been developed. People's attributions 
to such causes as luck, task difficulty, ability and effort 
while attempting a task have been obtained by recording the 
subjects spontaneous comments (Deiner and Dweck 1978; Brunson 
and Mathews 1981). Researchers have also examined achievement 
attributions by studying subjects post-task responses (Gilovich 
1983; Wong and Weiner 1981; Weiner et al 1972) . 
The method used to capture spontaneous attributions in this 
study is the thought listing probe (see Weiner 1985) 
Attributions to a causal source are spontaneous in the sense 
that subjects are not asked or directed to attribute causes to 
an event. Instead they are asked to imagine themselves in the 
situation described and to list what goes through their minds as 
the event happens. In this way any causal attributions that may 
occur will result naturally from the reaction to an event. It 
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is hypothesised that spontaneous attributions to God and the 
Devil will be elicited by subjects (hypothesis 1) . 
2.2.4 Situation factors that encourage causal 
attribution 
Generally, attributional search occurs following failure, or 
where negative consequences are perceived (Wong and Weiner 
1981) . It also tends to occur when outcomes are unexpected and 
causes appear to be ambiguous (Lau and Russell 1980; Wong and 
Weiner 1981; Hastie 1984; Bulman and Wortman 1977). 
According to the more conventional non-spontaneous 
approaches to the study of attributions, outcomes that are 
important and relevant to the subject, and events which carry 
extreme or severe consequences for individual tend to produce a 
great amount of causal thinking (Walster 1966; Lowe and Medway 
1976) . For events that happen to others, the degree of empathy 
(Hastie 1984), and the perceived likelihood of the event 
happening to oneself (Gorsuch and Smith 1983) affects the amount 
of attribution. 
Situation characteristics researchers have identified as 
producing ta substantial amount of causal attribution to God in 
religious samples are: the more important and personally 
relevant situations (Spilka and Schmidt 1983) and also extreme 
and improbable situations (Gorsuch and Smith 1983). 
Attributions to God are greater for the outcome rather than the 
intial action of an event (Brown 1984) . Furthermore, unjust and 
stressful outcomes tend to produce God attributions (Pargament 
14 
and Hahn 1986) . 
It is well documented that more God attribution occurs for 
positive-favourable outcomes than for negative- unfavourable 
outcomes (Spilka and Schmidt 1982; Ritzema 197 9) . It is 
expected that this valence trend occurs for the present 
investigation (hypothesis 2) . 
Events to do with health appear to elicit stronger 
attributions to God than events to do with finances, social 
relations or emotions (Spilka and Schmidt 1983) . Thus, God 
atributions in health (medical) situations are expected to be 
greater than in emotional or interpersonal situations 
(hypothesis 4) Ritzema's (1979) results contradicted this 
pattern, but his results are probably due to the medical 
situation being not important or realistic enough. 
2. 2. 5 Locus of control, religiosity and God attribution 
The external-internal dimensions are an important theme in 
attribution theory. Weiner et al (1972) and Ross and Fletcher 
(1985) note that that the external-internal dimensions can be 
construed in terms of personal control. In this sense, people 
may wonder if a cause is within their control (an internal 
attribution), or not within their control (an external 
attribution) . 
An intriguing possibilty arises when attributions to God are 
considered: Do religious subjects believe God is internal or 
external? Do religious subjects believe they have some control 
over God (or at least believe that they have some control over 
events in their life through their faith in God?) . One line of 
research that provides tentative support for this possibility 
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has been conducted by Piersma (1974); Sivestri (1979), and 
Kopplin (1976). They measured religious subjects' locus of 
control, using Rotter's scale (see Silvestri 1979). Rotter's 
scale measures the belief that one's life is externally or 
internally controlled. The results showed that religious 
subjects scored more highly on the internal dimension than less 
religious subjects. This finding has yet to be fully explained. 
It is possible that God is considered more as internal (with 
regards to control) for those subjects who are close to God, 
whereas those who are not so close to God may view Him more as 
external. Closeness to God is a dimension of religiosity (King 
and Hunt 1975). Therefore, those subjects that are highly 
religious may believe they have greater control over events in 
their life because they exert some influence over God. Other 
explanations for the positive relationship between religiosity 
and internality have been mooted. For example, Spilka, Hood and 
Gorsuch (1985) suggest that in the western world, religiosity 
positively correlates with the belief in free will because 
subjects believe free will is an important part of Christianity. 
Pargament's (1982) findings suggest that a better understanding 
of the locus of control and religiosity relationship may to be 
found in the patterns of attributions to a variety of causes. 
The concepts behind the petitionary prayer are discussed 
by Thouless (1971); Argyle and Beit Hallahmi (1975), and Brown 
(1966). A petitionary prayer is a request usually made to God. 
It is conjectured (in this thesis) that some of the student 
subjects believe they can have partial control over events by 
petitioning God. Brown's (1966) study found that younger 
children were the most likely to believe in the causal efficacy 
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of personal prayer, however, this belief may still exist for 
adult subjects. 
A one item scale was designed by the writer of this thesis 
to measure the extent to which subjects believe an outcome is 
contingent upon their petitionary prayer. This scale is called 
"Control of God by Prayer". Unfortunately it was not within 
the scope of this investigation to compare scores on Rotter's 
internal-external dimensions with either attribution to God 
scores or with scores on the Control of God by Prayer scale. 
Ritzema (1979) however, found no correlation between locus of 
control and the amount of attribution to God for his sample. 
Hypothesis 5 is simply that Control of God by Prayer will 
positively correlate with God attribution because they both 
represent dimensions of religiosity. Gorsuch and Smith (1983), 
and Ritzema (1979) point to God attribution as being an 
important component of religious committment. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that Ritzema's findings would 
be confirmed: King and Hunt's (1972) religiosity scales 
positively correlate with God attribution (hypothesis 5) 
Females tend to be more religious than males, in the 
Christian world at least (Batson and Vent is 1982; Argyle and 
Beit Hallahmi 1975), and there is also evidence that religiosity 
tends to decline from the ages of 16 to 30 years (Clarke 1958; 
Argyle and Beit Hallahmi ·1975). God attribution is expected to 
follow those religiosity trends according to hypotheses 9 and 
10. 
2.2.6 Sectarianism 
"It is clear that over the last fifteen years the 
centre of gravity of New Zealand Christianity has 
shifted in the direction of the 
Pentecostal/fundamentalist tradition" 
(Galvin 1982) 
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Thomson (1982) in a meeting of the Auckland Theology Forum in 
New Zealand states " . . . the charismatic movement has taken hold 
right across the board to an extent unparallelled anywhere else 
in the world". Others also see pluralism as a trend for the 
future of religion in New Zealand (Stuart 1981) . Various causes 
for an increase in the formation and attendance of sects in new 
Zealand and throughout the world have been suggested. These 
include the rise of secularism (Stuart 1981); escape from 
anomie combining with low reading levels (Dean 1968), (Nelson 
1972); or the poor and powerless finding compensation in 
exclusive religion because they are disinherited by society. 
Most people have their own understanding of the terms "sect", 
"cult", "fundamentalism" and "religious conservatism", and yet 
ironically academics can not agree on standard definitions for 
these terms. Knudsen, Earle and Shriver's (1978) analysis found 
the common themes behind researcher's definitions of the word 
"sectarianism" as being; (1) exclusive membership based upon 
personal religious experience, and (2) a total ideology of life 
and ethics" (Knudsen et al 1978; p. 59) Sectarianism is not 
purely defined in terms of membership to religious sects or 
groups, but instead is seen as an approach to life, 
characteristic of people belonging to sects. If such a 
definition is true then the psychological study of sectarian 
religious ideology and world view may provide a useful 
complement to the sociological perspective. For example, Nelsen 
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(1972) measured the sectarianism of 227 Southern Apalachians 
using his sectarianism scale. Nelsen characterises the 
sectarian person as one who claims exclusive membership, and who 
holds an image of God as righteous and exacting. A 
fundamentalist is operationally defined as a person who holds to 
a puritan morality and a literal interpretation of the Bible. 
The scale is a Guttman scale that is probably not 
unidimensional. As a general rule, Guttman scales should 
measure only one dimension. This limitation means that Nelsen's 
scale may not apply to samples outside the southern Appalachians 
region. Possibly a definition of fundamentalism as a 
literal, as opposed to a symbolic-mythological understanding of 
religion would help to clarify the distinction between 
fundamentalism, sectarianism, and conservatism (see Hunt 1972) . 
Ethridge and Feagin (1979) and Hood and Morris (1985) believe 
that the crucial factor is that fundamentalists refuse to accept 
evolutionary change, or at least the broadening of normative 
boundaries and so try to maintain their religious beliefs 
irrespective of outside pressures. However, religious 
conservatism could be broadly defined using the above principle. 
Ethridge and Feagin unwittingly equate conservation with 
fundamentalism, while Nelsen equates sectarianism with 
conservatism, and differentiates fundamentalism from 
sectarianism. Such lack of conceptual clarity is a problem but 
does at least attest to the conceptual closeness of the terms 
sectarianism, conservatism, and fundamentalism. 
The relationship between sectarianism and God attribution 
has not been investigated, but Gorsuch and Smith (1983) found 
that fundamentalism positively correlated with the amount of 
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responsibility attributed to God for his subjects. Gorsuch and 
Smith considered fundamentalism to be represent a dimension of 
religiosity. Nelsen (1972) indicates that sectarianism is a 
significant element of one's religious belief and meaning 
system. For these reasons, Nelsen's sectarianism scale is 
included in the present design in order to test the hypothesis 
that sectarianism positively correlates with attribution to God 
scores. Because the scale may lack external validity, it's 
reliability and validity are tested for the present New Zealand 
sample. 
2. 2. 7 Images of God 
"God is like my grandfather. He smiles a lot and 
fixes toys for you when you need him to." 
This is an 11 year old's account of what God is like from a 
study by Heller (1985) . It helps illustrate an important 
characteristic of thinking about God, that many envisage God as 
having qualities one would ascribe to people. Interestingly Van 
Buern's (1981) philosophical exploration leads him to state: 
As we speak of human beings "willing", "doing", 
"intending" and the like so we have spoken of God 
. . . We have been speaking of God aa a person not 
as if he were a person . . . the scriptural language 
requires us to say that the God of whom we are 
speaking is and must be a person. That is ~to 
say that God and human beings are the same- far 
from it." 
Even if an agreed definition of a "person" is arrived at there 
are various ways to counter the conclusion reached by Van Buern, 
which are not relevant to this discussion. However, it can not 
be denied that personal qualities are either implicitly or 
explicitly attributed to God in most thinking and writing of 
God. This point is manifested in the empirical and theoretical 
20 
work on God concepts. 
Much of the study on God concepts has centred on finding out 
where a person's God concept comes from. The results to date 
have done litle to clarify the issue. For example, Freud 
postulated that someone's God image originates from their Father 
image (Spilka Addison and Rosensohn 1975) . Adler suggests the 
preferred parent image shapes one's God image according to 
Spilka et al (1975). A social learning theory account of God 
image dictates that images of your same sex parent are projected 
on to God. These three theories are called projective theories. 
The empirical evidence provides rather limited support for all 
these theories. Spilka, Addison and Rosensohn (1975) conducted 
a partial test of the three projection theories mentioned 
(Freud's; Adler's; Social learning) , and a self esteem 
projection theory which maintains that negative or positive 
perceptions of oneself will determine one's God image. There 
was only slightly greater support for the social learning and 
self esteem hypotheses. Those with high self esteem tended to 
hold loving God images and those with low self esteen tended to 
hold Old Testament, punishing God images (Benson and Spilka 
1973) In Potvin's adolescent sample this held only for older 
females (Potvin 1977), although perceived parental control and 
socialisation from both parents and religious groups were 
important predictors of God image. These results support a 
further parental projection theory, plus a socialisation theory 
of God concept formation. 
The theories discussed here have a rather limited focus, 
usually on ones parents and self. As Spilka et al (1975) notes; 
divided attention to these theories neglects other potent 
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factors such as culture, history, and theological factors (see 
Nelsen et al 1973) . The empirical findings suggest that an 
integrated theory of concept formation is needed (Roof 1979). 
Research looking at the developmental sequence in the 
formation of God concepts has also been undertaken (see Mead 
1969; Goldman 1964). Piaget's schema of concept formation and 
stages of thinking have been applied to God images in this 
research, while at a descriptive level Heller (1985) finds that 
young children hold strong anthropomorphic images of God; for 
example, God is seen as the "healer", "friendly ghost" and the 
"romantic lover." A bearded old man with magical like powers is 
a stereotypical God image for the young according to Goldman 
(1964). A third approach to the study of God images is to 
examine the relationship between images of God and other aspects 
of individuals religious belief systems. 
taken in the present investigation. 
This is the approach 
The present investigation examines God image in relation to 
God attribution. First, the empirical methods researchers 
have used to obtain a person's God image are reviewed. Second, 
the specific predictions regarding the relationship between 
God image and God attribution are presented. 
Fairly straight forward approaches have been used to obtain 
a person's image of God. Typically, subjects are supplied with 
a variety of adjectives derived from people's own descriptions 
of God. They are then asked to rate how accurately each 
adjective describes God (on a Likert scale). Another similar 
approach asks the subject to place their image of God on 
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continuums of bipolar adjectives, e.g. from strong=1 to weak=7: 
If the subject thinks God is extremely strong then she/he will 
circle position 1. After the subject has rated the 
adjectives, semantic differential and factor analysis techniques 
are then used to sort out clusters of adjectives that represent 
God image factors. Spilka, Amatas and Nussbaum (1964) measured 
God image factors for a Catholic and general sample. Despite a 
few sample group differences in God image strong factors for the 
general group included a loving God,a stern father-punishing 
God, an omniness (allness factor) an a distant permissive and 
a benevolent ruler factor. Research 
Gorsuch (1968); Roof and Roof (1984); 
has been extended by 
Broughton (1975) Muthen 
et al (1977) and evidence for a strong traditional Christian 
deistitic factor (e.g. God is allwise, divine, strong etc), a 
passive - active, factor and personal-impersonal factors exists. 
Broughton (1975) finds that people also view God in terms of His 
immanence and scrutibility. 
One problem with this research is that it has been largely 
dependent upon christian samples. A consideration of other 
religions and agnostic conceptions of God, possibly using 
construct theory as designed by Fransella and Bannister (1977) 
should provide a wider framework for understanding God concepts. 
Other non scriptural views of God appear to have had little 
place in the studies to date. The advantage of the adjectival 
approach used is that its simplicity allows other aspects of a 
person's life and religion to be compared with their "God 
image". So, for example, one's mental health and self esteem 
(see Spilka Hood and Gorsuch 1985), one's culture or attribution 
tendency (Brown 1984) have been related to God image. In this 
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sense God image may be thought of as one aspect of an integrated 
belief system. 
Only Brown's (1984) study has examined the relationship 
between God image and God attribution. Brown's results point 
to subtle links between God attribution and God image factors 
which need further explanation. Those subjects in Brown's 
sample who held a "Kindly Father" image tended to attribute 
outcomes to God's intervention more so than those who did not 
hold such an image. Those who viewed God as omnipotent and 
omniscient tended not to attribute human actions to God's will, 
but those who stressed a punishing image of God did. These two 
findings point to a complex relationship between God image and 
God attribution. 
This thesis does not attempt to explore the complexities of 
Brown's results any further. Instead it is postulated that 
those who see God as very loving will be tend to causally 
attribute positive (happy) outcomes to God more so than those 
who don't view God as so loving (hypothesis 6). The rationale 
for this prediction is that, people who emphasise a loving God 
image believe God demonstrates His love in this way. Also, 
predicted that those who emphasise God as punishing will tend 
to invoke God for negative (unhappy) outcomes, for they believe 
God expresses His anger in this way (hypothesis 7) . Pargament 
and Hahn (1986) give some support to this image of God account 
of God attribution. Such an account may also explain why God 
tends to be invoked for posit outcomes rather than negative 
outcomes, for most people tend to stress the loving qualities of 
God (Pargament and Hahn 1986) . 
A consequence of the image of God account is that those 
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people who conceive God as being personal and active will tend 
to attribute outcomes to God, more so than those who don't 
stress the personal-active God image. Hypothesis 8 predicts that 
subjects will respond in this way. 
2.2.8 Motivation for attributions 
Spilka, Shaver and Kirkpatrick (1985) see the motivational 
basis of attribution as a foundation for a study of the 
psychology of religion. They argue that the motivation to look 
for causes is the same for both natural and supernatural 
attributions and that religious attributions se in response 
to the desire to find meaning, the des for control, and the 
desire to maintain or enhance self esteem. Indeed these 
motivations may help explain the functions of religion itself 
(see Yinger 1969; Nelsen et al 1976) . 
What makes people search for causes and why do people engage 
in attributional activity? Questions such as these are at the 
heart of a motivational and functional understanding of causal 
attribution. Ultimately motivations appear to serve a survival 
and self protective function; for instance, Walster (1966) 
devised the defensive-protective hypothesis, that people 
attribute negative events to sources that protect themselves 
from future blame. Chaiken and Darley (1973); Shaver (1970); 
Shaw and Skolnck (1971} and Lowe and Medway (1976) provide some 
support for Walsters hypothesis. Attributional egotism; " 
the tendency to take credit for good outcomes and deny blame for 
bad ones" (Snyder et al 1978) is self serving. Attributions may 
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also function to enhance or maintain levels of self esteem 
(Fitch 1970) or to present a favourable self image to others 
(Kelly and Michela 1980, p.475). 
A different motivational theme is the desire to find meaning 
about events in the world. Complementary to Heider's (1958) 
view of people as naive psychologists is the human desire to 
explore, extract information and gain knowledge of our world 
(Frankl 1963) . 
A search for meaning in life and in specific events is 
extremely relevant to the psychology of religion. The cognitive 
approach to religion as a meaning belief system and the 
relevance of religious meaning to one's life provides an 
heuristic avenue for future research (Roof 197 9; Glock and 
Piazza 1978; Brinkerhoff and Jacob 1987; Kroll-Smith and Couch 
1987; Preston 1987; Gruner 1984; Nelsen 1972; Peterson and 
Roy 1985; Van Der Lans 1985; Schweiker 1969; Pargament and 
Hahn 1986) Work conducted on people's ultimate concerns and 
religious 
perspective 
beliefs is also relevant to the meaning 
(e.g., Yinger 1969; Nelson et al 1976) . 
system 
Many of 
these researchers stress religion's role as providing meaning in 
life, and in events. For example, Bulman abd Wortman (1977) 
noted that several of their subjects believed God had a reason 
for allowing their spinal injuries to occur. 
A motivational theme related to the desire for meaning is 
the desire to obtain a consistent and structured life. Lerner's 
"Just World" hypothesis dictates that people attempt to provide 
an orderly world by believing the world functions on a principle 
of justice (Lerner 197 5; Karnoil 1980) . Pargament and Hahn 
(1986) examined God's prceived role in the provision of a just 
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and moral world. They found, that for most of their subjects, 
a just world (dependent upon God as a moral guide) was not a 
major determinant of God attributions. Research in other 
situations, and using select samples has produced different 
results (Karnoil 1980) . 
Extending from the desire to obtain a consistent world by 
attributing events to causes is the desire to predict and 
control events. The desire to be free is another motivation 
concerning personal control (Fishoff 1976; Wortman 1975; Langer 
1975; Wortman and Dintzer 1978; Worchel and Andreoli 1976; 
Harvey 1976) . 
Attributions seem to function as a coping strategy. Bulman 
and Wortman (1977} found that self blame for a severe accident 
was adaptive. Further research on the importance of attribution 
to effective coping and adjustment has been conducted by Nunn, 
Kosa and Alpert (1968); Metalsky et al (1982); Pargament and 
Hahn (1986); Taylor et al (1984). Comfort and security provided 
by God in times of crisis may aid coping. Peterson and Roy 
(1985} developed a scale that measured the comfort provided by 
God and religion. It is postulated that those subjects who are 
dependent upon God for comfort will be more likely to attribute 
outcomes to God (hypothesis 5) . 
2.3 Aims and Hypotheses 
The ten specific hypotheses are presented with the first three 
aims of research in mind, that is, to examine patterns of 
attributions to the religious supernatural across different 
situations, to compare people's religious attribution with other 
aspects of their religious belief system, and to compare forced 
choice rating attributions to the supernatural with spontaneous 
attributions to the supernatural. In addition to the 
hypotheses, the spontaneous religious content produced by the 
thought listing task is explored. The nature and importance of 
religious thoughts for individuals who experience li 
are examined. 
crisis 
Most of the hypotheses follow from the review of God 
attribution literature but the major difference in approach here 
is that hypotheses are tested by two methods. The first method 
is the thought listing method which probes for spontaneous 
attributions. No other studies have empirically investigated 
spontaneous attributions to religious sources. The second 
method is the traditional forced cho rating method which 
scales non-spontaneous attributions. 
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The hypotheses are: 
1. Spontaneous causal attributions to 
by the subjects. 
God or the Devil are made 
2. God's causal influence is seen as greater for favourable 
outcomes than for unfavourable outcomes. 
3. Causal attributions to the Devil occur for unfavourable 
outcomes but not for favourable outcomes. 
4. Causal God attributions are stronger in Medical situations than in 
either Emotional or Interpersonal situations. 
5. Causal God attributions positively correlate with each religious scale 
The scales measure: sectarianism; religiosity; control of God by 
prayer; religious comfort and; the perception of God's personal 
influence (refer to section 3.2.2 for a description of the scales). 
Furthermore, scales that measure the perception of how often God 
influences events in one's life (Q .1), and the belief that God 
directly intervenes in one's life (Q.2) correlate the most highly with 
God attribution tendency. 
6. The conception of God as loving positively correlates with attribution 
to God for favourable outcomes. 
7. The conception of God as punishing, positively correlates with 
attribution to God for unfavourable-negative outcomes. 
8. The conception of God as personal and active positively correlates 
with total attribution to God. 
9. Younger subjects produce stronger attributions to God than older 
subjects. 
10. Female. subjects produce stronger attributions to God than male 
subjects. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
3.1 Sample 
Seventy four subjects in this study were all tertiary 
students. Sixty four attended the University of Canterbury 
while 18 attended Nelson Polytechnic. The majority of subjects 
were contacted through Canterbury University's Christian Union. 
The Union contains over 200 students belonging to a variety of 
Church denominations. 
The aim of sample selection was to optimise sample 
heterogeneity (within practical constraints) so that the 
hypotheses could be adequately tested, and valid and meaningful 
conclusions could be drawn. 
guided sample selection: 
Therefore the following criteria 
a) the subjects consider themselves Christians, or in some 
cases agnostics; 
b) there is a cross section of Christian tertiary students 
with regards to age, sex, denomination and religious 
committment; 
c) the sample contains subjects that can imagine 
themselves as part of the scenarios and can coherently 
write down their thoughts in response. 
Christian subjects were sought for several reasons. 
Firstly, empirical research on causal attribution to Divinity 
has traditionally used Christian samples and direct comparisons 
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with this research is possible when Christian subjects are 
sampled. Secondly, the religious scales available, are most 
suited to Christian subjects. With the target population being 
predominantly Christian a detailed analysis of attribution to 
God should be possible. 
An examine religious 
different religions (e.g. 
the general population 
investigation. Emphasis 
source attribution for a variety of 
Muslim, Judaism, Hindu, etc) or for 
is beyond the scope of this 
in this study is placed on the 
psychological and situational characteristics of religious 
attribution rather than the demographic and sociological 
factors. 
Sample description 
Thirty nine subjects were female, thirty five were male. They 
were aged between 18 and 30 years. Table 1. below, displays 
age, sex and religious denominations. Because of the large 
number of denominations (and the small cell sizes resulting) it 
is not possible to examine the relationship between denomination 
and religious attribution. However subjects were grouped on the 
sectarianism scale and sectarianism was compared with religious 
attribution. 
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Table 1. Sex, Age and Denominations of Subjects 
.s.EX Frequency AGE Frequency DENOMINATION Frequency 
FEMALES 39 18 13 Anglican 21 
MALES 35 19 15 Assembly of God 1 
20 14 Baptist 12 
21 10 Brethren 1 
22 11 Catholic 12 
23 4 "Christian" 1 
24 1 Elim 1 
25 3 Methodist· 3 
26 1 None 7 
27 0 Presbyterian 1 
28 0 Reformed Church 1 
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3.2 Questionnaire Constuction 
The written questionnaire was designed by the author in 
three parts. Part 1 was designed to capture spontaneous 
attributions to the religious supernatural. 
attributions to God and the Devil on 
Part 2 measured 
ced choice Likert 
scales. Part 3 was developed to see how aspects of religiosity 
and beliefs about God relate to religious attribution. 
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3.2.1 Scenario Design 
Six different scenarios (event - outcome descriptions) were 
developed by the writer for Part 1 and Part 2. Each of the six 
scenarios consisted of a hypothetical situation or set of events 
involving the subject. The events were personal life events. 
In order for the subject to place themselves in the situation 
described, events that the subjects could identify with or that 
were particularly relevant to the student were chosen. Certain 
other event characteristics were included in the scenarios 
because they tend to produce causal thinking. For example, all 
the scenarios had unexpected outcomes. 
The outcome valence and situation domain were the factors 
containing the independent variables. The dependent measures 
were the resulting attribution scores. The design is 
illustrated in Table 2 below. 
Table 2. Valence and Domain Factors of Scenario Design 
SITUATION 
DOMAIN: 
OUTCOME 
VALENCE: 
Medical 
Positive Negative 
Emotional Interpersonal 
Positive Negative Positive Negative 
The scenarios are presented in Appendix Al and also in 
Appendix A2. The medical-negative scenario describes an accident 
causing paraplegia whereas the 
describes the recovery from a 
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medical-positive scenario 
threatening cancer. The 
emotional-positive scenario gives an account of the recovery of 
self esteem through the acquisition of a job, while the 
emotional-negative depicts severe depression. The marriage 
breakdown of one's parents is described in the 
interpersonal-negative condition whereas the commitment by one's 
partner towards marriage depicts the interpersonal-positive 
scenario. 
The six different scenarios were combined into three domains. 
The rst situation domain contained medical events, the second 
contained emotional events, and the third contained 
interpersonal events. Within each of these domains one scenario 
had a positive-favourable outcome the other had a 
negative-unfavourable outcome. Therefore, three of the 
scenarios had positive-favourable outcomes while the other three 
had a negative-unfavourable outcomes. 
There are certain event-outcome characteristics that 
encourage causal thinking. The scenarios were shaped so that 
the initial event and subsequent outcome could be differentiated 
by the subjects. This clarification helped to determine exactly 
what was being attributed. Brown ( 1984) noted more God 
attributions for outcomes than for initial events. This was a 
second reason for differentiating the events from the outcome. 
Care was taken to select situations where subjects were likely 
some experience or knowledge of; For example, it was not likely 
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that many of the tertiary students had experienced stomach 
cancer, but it was likely that they knew of people who had. 
Subjects are likely to have seen television dramas, 
documentaries or read about terminal cancer cases. This 
knowledge should help them to picture themselves in the 
situation described by the scenario. 
3.2.2 Religious scales Part 3 
The third part involved selecting predesigned religious 
scales and creating items that uncover some cognititive - belief 
factors important in religious source attribution. Religious 
attribution was not examined as a phenomenon on its own, but was 
treated as a component of a person's meaning and bel system. 
Ritzema (1979) and Spilka Hood and Gorsuch (1985) take a similar 
perspective in their approach to the study of religious 
attributions. This section provides a partial replication of 
Ritzema's (1979), Brown's 1984, and Gorsuch and Smith's (1983} 
design. 
Several empirical scales were surveyed and some of the 
scales that appeared relevant to God attribution were included 
in Part 3. The principles that guided scale selection were 
firstly, that scales should be reasonably short so that the 
subject does not have to spend too long completing the 3 part 
questionnaire and secondly, that scales should be most relevant 
to a person's cognitions, bel fs and religious source 
attribution. 
Some scales that were initially accepted for inclusion were 
excluded because they did not appear to have any meaningful 
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relationship with religious attribution; one example is King 
and Hunt's ( 197 5) Purpose in Life scale. Exactly how life 
purpose would affect religious attribution patterns is unclear, 
therefore that scale was not included. 
The scales selected for administration were: 
1. Sectarianism/fundamentalism/conservatism (Nelson 1972); 
2. Deyotionalism (King and Hunt 1972); 
3. Salience: Cognition (Hunt and King 1972); 
4. Religious comfort and dependence (Peterson and Roy 
1985); 
5 . God Image (Broughton 1975; Potvin 1977; Gorsuch 1968); 
In addition to these scales, items were developed by the writer 
to measure; 
6. How God's influence is perceived/conceived; 
7. Control of God by Prayer. 
1. The Sectarianism scale measures a person's degree of 
sectarianism. 
2. The Devotionalism scale measures an aspect of religiosity 
that involves one's closeness to God and personal prayer 
life. 
3. Cognitive Salience also measures an aspect of religiosity 
but is primarily concerned with the importance of religion 
and God in a person's life 
4. The Religious Comfort Belief scale taps a person's 
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dependence upon God for comfort in the sense that God's plan 
is perceived as secure and benign. 
5. The scale measuring God images uses adjectival rating to 
scale a persons image of God along four God image factors 
Adjectives that loaded highly on any of the factors from 
previous studies were chosen. They were ordered randomly so 
that the subject would respond to each adjective per se, 
rather than to a cluster of similar adjectives. 
The factor srepresented by the adjectives are: a loving 
God; a punishing God; an omni God (e.g.) omniscient, 
omnipresent (etc.); an active and personal God. Subjects' 
God images were weighted during coding according to these 
four factors. It was expected that a subjects God 
attribution style would be dependent upon that person's 
conception of God's nature. 
6. The four items focussing on God's influence look at the 
perception of hQli God influences events in one's life 
(Appendix A3 p.134). 
7. The item used to scale "one's control of God" was designed 
to measure the extent to which the subjects' believe their 
own petitionary prayer to God (or Jesus) will effect a 
desired outcome. It is: " Through prayer, if you sincerely 
ask God to help you how often will God help you?" 
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3.4 Procedure 
Spontaneous method - Part 1 
The subjects were presented with a written scenario and 
asked to imagine that the scenario is rea 1 and that the 
situation described is happening to them. They were then 
requested to; "List what goes through your mind with regard to 
the EVENTS and OUTCOME ... " (see Appendix Al) . They completed 
this thought listing task for all six scenarios. The thought 
listing probe is a simple technique that has few demand 
characteristics. For this reason no other questions were 
included in Part 1. The subject's own reaction to the scenario 
was primary. A second advantage of the thought listing probe 
used is that is captures feelings as well as cognitions. 
Forced choice method - Part 2 
The same six scenarios were presented to subjects in Part 2 
and the subjects were again asked to imagine that the scenario 
is ~ and that the situation described is happening to them. A 
method of causal rating followed by most attribution researchers 
was then used. Six possible causes were provided for the 
subject. They were asked to rate the extent each cause is 
responsible for the OUTCOME of the scenario, from 
1. = Not at all to 7. = Very great extent on the 7 point 
Likert scale (see Appendix A2). The causal categories provided 
were: "You (the central character)"; "luck"; "fate"; "God"; 
nother people (whether in Scenario or not)"; "Devil". 
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Attributions to multiple causes and causal weighting is captured 
by this method. The method used of weighting multiple causes is 
a more sophisticated method than one which only captures 
attributions to a single cause. 
Order of presentation 
a) The six scenarios presented to each subject were randomly 
ordered for Part 1- the Spontaneous Method to counter any order 
effect for scenario presentation. 
b) The questionnaire was made up of three separately stapled 
sections; Part 1; Part 2; Part 3. The order in which these 
sections were completed was important for the aims of research: 
If subjects completed Part 3 (the religious sales) before 
completing Part 1, it is likely that religion would be in the 
front of their minds. Religion would be more cognitively 
salient at that stage and so religious thinking would be more 
prominent when completing the spontaneous task. Similarly, if 
Part 2 (the causal ratings) were completed first, subjects may 
be more inclined to elicit attributions when completing the 
spontaneous part. Furthermore, the subject would find it easier 
to guess the experimenter's aim (to study spontaneous God or 
Devil attributions) . Bias may then occur for the spontaneous 
task because God attributions could be elicited to satisfy 
experimenter expectations. 
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Presentation and Collection 
The data was collected in November {198 6) . It was not 
possible to get a large group of Christian students together at 
this time to fill out the questionnaire as exams were very near, 
so the majority of scripts were personally delivered to the 
subjects residence and collected a day or two later. Clear 
verbal instructions were given to complete the sections in order 
and not to look at the subsequent sections until the prior ones 
were completed. This point was emphasised when speaking to 
subjects. Subjects were shown the t le page of Part 1 of the 
questionnaire (Appendix Al) and told that Part 2 and 3 were 
follow-ups to Part 1. 
40 
3.5 Limitations of Method 
1. One major limitation of the scenario methodology is the 
artificiality of using a subject's imagination to 'create' 
situations. The scenarios are not real and the subject is not 
actually involved in the situations. As a consequence several 
factors are not included in the scenarios - for example, peer 
pressure, interpersonal communication, and temporal factors as 
well as the perceptual- phenomenological factors associated with 
the reality of experience. More research is needed to determine 
whether people react cognitively to a hypothetical scenario the 
same way they react to the real happening. Possibly subjects 
react to the personal involvement scenario as if they were 
reading about other people's life events, rather than actually 
experiencing the events themselves. Jones and Nisbett (1972) 
and Spilka and Schmidt ( 1983) provide a basis to test this 
possibility. 
2. Event characteristics of hypothetical scenarios are often 
manipulated in by attribution researchers, yet it is unclear 
what event characte ics actually make up a situation. A 
study of how the people perceive the difference between various 
situations should clarify the role of event characteristics. 
However, at this stage, a major problem associated with the 
elusive nature of situations is that it is difficult' to 
experimentally control for the event characteristics of a 
scenario. 
3. In the present design six different event outcome 
scenarios were created. Two different event-outcome scenarios 
represented each domain. One had an unfavourable (negative) 
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outcome, the other had a favourable (positive) outcome. Thus as 
outcome valence changed so did the complete scenario. 
Gorsuch and Smith (1983) merely altered the outcome of the 
scenario in order to change the valence. For a repeated 
measures design Gorsuch and Smiths' procedure is somewhat 
artificial because the subjects must imagine two outcomes for 
the same initial event. Furthermore, a much larger number of 
situation outcomes is needed to represent situation domains. It 
should be noted however, that for my design it is the valence of 
the situation domain factor rather than the valence of the 
scenario per se that is being examined with respect to 
attribution. 
4. The questionnaires were administered to the subjects 
individually and the subjects were relied upon to complete the 
questionnaire in the proper order, without supervision. A 
better method is to administer the Parts 1, 2 and 3 successively 
to each subject (in one venue) . Although this may lead to 
subjects hurrying their responses, at least the proper order of 
questionnaire completion is ensured. Unfortunately it was not 
possible to assemble a large group of Christian students 
together when administering the questionnaire. 
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3.6 Coding Proce4ure 
There were two types of coding procedures used. The 
spontaneous expression (Part 1) was analysed for content and 
style by three coders before storing on computer files whereas 
the numerical likert scale responses were simply collated and 
organised on computer files. 
Spontaneous Thinking 
The author and two other 
background to the subjects, 
thought listing responses. 
explicit coding instructions. 
coders comparable 
separately coded 
The other coders 
in age and 
all of the 
were given 
They also had practice and 
coaching from the author using some preselected scenario 
responses from different subjects. While the practice was most 
important in clarifying a systematic approach to coding, the 
coaching allowed room for the coders own interpntation. It was 
important that all three of the coders' interpretations should 
be represented. Considering the number and type of coding 
categories, the initial interjudge agreement was 86 percent. 
Any discrepancies were reviewed and quickly resolved during a 
group discussion. 
groups decisions. 
A final copy was produced based upon the 
The open ended expressive responses given for Part 1 were 
coded according to attributional content and non causal 
religious content. This was done in two stages. 
43 
The first stage was to code for causal thinking, including 
aspects of cognitive-linguistic style of causal thinking. For 
example, the subject's spontaneous causal attributions to God 
were coded as either implied or stated. The amount of causal 
search and causal complexity was also coded (see Appendix Bl 
for an example the first coded form for subject 44) . The 
second stage involved coding the spontaneous material on 
religious content that was not strictly causal in nature. In 
addition, causal attributions to God were receded as either 
confident and tentative (Appendix B2) . 
3. 6 .1 Causal content 
Firstly a coding system was developed that coded causal 
content and style. A major aim was to compare causal 
attribution using the thought listing task with forced choice 
causal attribution, therefore spontaneous causal attributions 
were coded under the headings of attributions to "self"; 
"others" ; "~"; ".l.:!J..Q.k"; ".G..Q.d"; and "The Devil". These were 
also the forced choice causal categories: each attribution was 
either coded as implied or stated directly. The coding was 
done separately for each scenario. The six scenarios were 
denoted on the coding sheets as "accident" (the 
medical-negative situation); "cancer" (the medical-positive 
outcome scenario); "results" (the emotional -negative outcome 
scenario); "job" (the emotional negative outcome scenario); 
"fiance" (the interpersonal positive outcome scenario) ; and 
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"parents" (the interpersonal negative outcome scenario) . 
Appendix A1 shows the scenarios referred. to in the coding form 
Appendix B ( 1) . 
Each coder had to decide whether the subject was attributing 
the intial events (coded "E'), the outcome (coded "0") or both 
of these (coded "E/0") to a causal source. Every attribution 
was coded by writing the line number from which the attribution 
came. This enabled a quick referencing of attributions so that 
any coding disagreements were quickly settled. Further 
analysis of the coded data was fast and efficient with such a 
reference system. 
Importantly, it was the tally of the line numbers separated 
by commas (not the line number itself) that represented the 
number of spontaneous attributions. The tally represented the 
frequency or strength of the attributions in each scenario and 
was calculated and entered into computer files after all the 
category coding was completed. Tallying the number of 
attributional statements, thoughts or speculations seemed a 
more logical way of scaling the amount or strength of 
attributional content than just tallying the number of 
sentences or lines devoted to attribution as some other studies 
have done. 
Bettman and Weitz (1983) used a combination of methods to 
scale the amount of attribution. A difficult problem in coding 
arose when two or more attributional statements in a subject's 
response to a scenario were very similar: should they be 
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regarded purely as redundant repetitions or should they be 
coded as two separate attributions ? Firstly, the position 
taken by all coders was that no statements or thoughts were 
redundant and that a repetition at least had significance in 
that it emphasised the salience or importance of the cause for 
the subject. Secondly, in most cases similar statements 
appeared to differ in subtle and meaningful ways. Subtle 
differences were revealed by the fact that similar (not word 
for word) attributions occurred in reaction to different parts 
of the outcome. In support Grigg (1986), Ross and Fletcher 
(1985) and Bourque and Back (1971) note that linguistic 
differences are more than just grammatical whims but are also 
valid indicators of underlying cognitive differences. There 
were, in any case, relatively few subjects who repeated 
themselves to any extent. 
In addition to coding causal attributions to the specified 
causal categories of "self", "luck", "God" etc., the coders 
recorded the number of thoughts concerned with causal search in 
the "Questions concerning cause" category. Statements (or a 
collection of statements) that showed evidence of complex 
causal thinking were referenced under the heading "Complex 
causal thinking". It would have been possible to measure 
causal complexity by counting the number of causes a person 
attributes the outcome to ("differentiation" complexity -
Fletcher et al 1986, p. 002). The causal complexity category 
in this study was instead concerned with the tendency of the 
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subject to explain events by temporally and spatially linking 
chains of causes, and with the subject's invocation of 
principles and abstract concepts regarding causality. A 
person's metacognition relating to explanations was of 
importance. This type of causal complexity is concerned with 
the ''integration phase" of cognition (Fletcher et al 1986) . 
Because of the conceptual and methodological problems 
associated with numerically scaling the amount of causal 
complexity, the analysis and conclusions given in later 
chapters centre on the obvious trends of causally complex 
thinking rather than on a detailed statistical examination of 
causal complexity. Here is an example of one subject's 
complex causal thinking: 
"It was God who instilled confidence in me to overcome my 
low self esteem and this positive attitude then helped me 
get a job" 
A chain of causes is linked in order to explain the outcome. 
One example of a subject's implied causal attribution to 
self was: 
"I should have worked harder. What a better chance if only I 
had worked." 
This was coded as an implied attribution to self because it can 
only be inferred that the subject attributes the outcome to 
herself. The essence of an "implied attribution" is that the 
subject's attributional- linguistic style is not as direct as a 
"stated attribution". Two examples of stated attributions to 
"self" were; 
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"It was my fault I guess" and "Look what I've done now." 
Questions such as "Why me?" and " Was it the doctor's doing?" 
were coded as "causal search questions", as they express a 
search for the cause or the reason behind the outcome. Appendix 
B (1) gives the form that was used to code causal content for 
subject tl. Further examples of the types of attributions and 
causal thinking that were coded can be obtained in this thesis 
by referencing the appropriate scenario in Appendix A1 using 
coding form B (1) . 
3. 6. 2 Religious thinking and non-causal God attributions 
The second stage of category design was completed after 
causal content was coded. Certain religiously based themes 
appeared to stand out when the author was reading spontaneous 
responses to the life crises (in the first stage of coding). 
Therefore over 100 spontaneous thoughts containing religious 
content were identified and rewritten. They included: 
attributions to God; statements about God and Jesus, the 
afterlife, personal faith and prayer etc. By reading reading 
through the list of religiously based thoughts these themes 
became much more obvious, and thus formed the basis of the 
religious thinking categories. The religious theme categories 
developed were: 
Asking- God (or Jesus) for help e.g. :"I pray for a way through 
this time"; 
Thanking God e.g. "God be praised I am alive!"; 
Faith and relationship e.g. "I should not have doubted you 
Lord, I feel closer to you now"; 
God's Reasons, e.g. "Maybe God wants me to learn from the 
experience". 
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It was also evident that different types of attribution to 
God occurred that were not purely causal God attributions. There 
were several statements referring to God's plan; 
"This must have been God's plan" or "God must have wanted 
this to happen". 
These statements attribute the outcome to God's plan and God's 
will respectively. There were also statements of the type; 
"God is always in control" or "God is in control, I know" 
These two statements appeared to reflect a general faith in God 
as a benign and immanent controller, regardless of earthly 
circumstances. Such affirmations were viewed as being 
conceptually related to causal God attributions but differed in 
that they were general or global attributions to God's control: 
The statements do not explicitly refer to specific cause and 
effect relationships, or to specific instances in time. 
Attribution to "God's control" appears to parallel the religious 
locus of control attribution disposition studied by Glock and 
Piazza (1978) and Piersma (1974). At that stage of coding it 
was not known whether subjects differentiated between 
attributions to God's will and God's plan, but it was assumed 
that an attribution to the will of God did not necessarily imply 
that subjects saw this as part of God's plan. Another point 
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that was considered was that it is arguable whether the 
categor s "Attribution to God's will" or "God's plan or 
purpose" are strictly attributions. However, attributions to 
God's will, plan and purpose could easily come under heading 
of intention and meaning attributions (see Heider 1958; Jones 
and Davis 1965) 
This thesis is mainly concerned with attribution to God, and 
in particular spontaneous attribution to God. For this reason 
the spontaneous attributions to God (called "attributions 
to God's hand" on the coding sheets) were re-examined to 
identi the number of tentative and confident spontaneous 
causal attributions to God. An example of a tentative causal 
attribution to God was: "Maybe God was involved with my 
recovery.", while an example of a stated causal attribution to 
God was: "God has worked things out again.". 
3.6.3 Likert Scale Responses 
In contrast to the spontaneous response coding, the closed 
scale coding for Part 2 and Part 3 was a relatively simple task. 
The data was simply arranged according to the pre-designed 
scales. The one exception was the coding of Nelsen's (1972) 
sectarianism scale for Part 3. Nelsen used a sample of Southern 
Appalachian Presbyterians to test the validity of his 
sectarianism scale. The scale may not have been valid for the 
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New Zealand sample therefore a Guttman analysis was performed on 
the scale items to test validity. 
(a 
In order for the scale to 
coefficient of scalabilty > 
pass 
0. 6, 
the validity criteria 
and a coefficient of 
reproducibility of> 0.9), one of Nelsen's original items had to 
be excluded. Also the midpoints had to be optimally positioned 
in order to meet the scale criteria (Guttman scaling procedure 
is discussed by Ford 1950). Nevertheless, the modified 
sectarianism scale proved a valid measure for the New Zealand 
sample. 
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3.7 Statistical Analysis 
The statistics commonly used in religious attribution 
designs have been analysis of variance and simple correlation 
statistics (Ritzema 1979; Gorsuch and Smith 1983; Spilka and 
Schmidt 1983) . 
Statistics were used here to examine differences and 
correlations between the independent and dependent variables. 
They included multi-variate and uni-variate analysis of 
variance, discriminant analysis, simple and multiple 
correlation, nominal association statistics (uncertainty 
coefficient & lambda), and Guttman analysis. The computing 
package Spss-x was used to compute statistics. In addition to 
the above techniques, the frequency and scattergram sub-programs 
were used to graphically display the distributions of 
attribution scores as well as correlation patterns. These 
graphs helped to identify any peculiarities in the distribution 
of data. 
Man ova 
Manova (multi-variate analysis of variance) was performed 
for the results of each of the two attribution methodologies. 
Manova takes into account the intercorrelations between a set of 
variables, and was appropriate here because of significant 
correlations between the variables containing attribution 
scores. One "set" of variables is represented by the situation 
valence factor containing the two variables of favourable and 
unfavourable outcome. The other "set" is represented by the 
situation domain factor containing three variables of medical, 
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emotional, and interpersonal domains. Therefore,to test for the 
effect of domain and valence upon religious attribution scores a 
2x3 repeated measures Manova was conducted for each attribution 
methodology. Univariate contrasts were then used to determine 
what specific situation differences were evident. The effects 
of sex, age and sectarianism upon religious attribution were 
also tested using the manova subprogram. 
Guttman Analysis 
The SPSS Guttman procedure helped to build and test the 
validity of the sectarianism scale. The items were designed by 
Nelsen (1972) . 
Correlations 
SIMPLE and PARTIAL correlation coefficients were used to 
examine intercorrelations amongst independent.· variables and to 
note correlation patterns of interest. They were also used to 
identify correlations between religious scale scores and God 
attribution scores. 
MULTIPLE correlations gave the unique variance contribution 
of each religious scale to God attribution scores. They 
determined which of the religious scales best predicted God 
attribution tendency. 
NOMINAL association statistics (lambda and the uncertainty 
coefficient) were used to help compare spontaneous God 
attributions with forced choice God attribution. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
The results follow the outline given by the aims of 
research. Results are grouped into four sections. Section 4.1 
gives the results for the hypotheses. The hypotheses are tested 
using both the forced choice and spontaneous response methods. 
Sections 4. 2 to 4. 4 contain further results that provide 
insights into causal religious attribution, causal search and 
complexity. Section 4.5 summarises the findings in response to 
an exploration of non causal religious attributions, and 
religious cognitions of subjects in crisis situations. Lastly, 
a statistical comparison of forced choice and spontaneous 
attribution is summarised in section 4.6. 
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Figure 5. CAUSAL SEARCH 
{by Domain) 
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Figure 12. FAITH, & RELATIONSHIP WITH GOD STATEMENTS 
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4.1 Hypotheses Results 
E'or Hypothesis 1: 
Subjects spontaneous~y and causa~~y attribute outcomes 
to God or the Devi~. 
As predicted spontaneous causal attributions to God or the 
Devil were produced. Spontaneous causal attribution to the Devil 
appears to be a limited phenomenon for this sample as only 3 
people suggested that the Devil was causally responsible for any 
of the event-outcomes. 
Figure 1a gives the mean number of spontaneous causal God 
attributions for each scenario outcome. From figure 1a it is 
evident that some of the sample spontaneously attributed 
outcomes to God. This occurred for all scenarios. There were 
99 spontaneous outcome attributions to God for the sample giving 
an average of 1.4 God attributions per person (0.22 per person 
per scenario) . Just over half of the sample ( 42 out of 7 4 = 
0.6) spontaneously attributed at least 1 outcome to God. 
Analysis on the cognitive style of these spontaneous 
attributions showed that: 
8% were tentative or speculative; 
92% were confident; 
75% were implied; 
25% were directly stated. 
In contrast to the 99 outcome attributions to God, 44 
spontaneous initial event attributions occurred. 
outcome attributions are analysed in this thesis. 
Only the 
For Hypothesis 2: 
God is invoked more 
un£avourable outcomes. 
Spontaneous Method 
£or £avourable 
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outcomes than 
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed. There were a greater number of 
spontaneous causal attributions to God for favourable outcomes 
than for unfavourable outcomes (Figure 1b} . A 2x3 repeated 
measures Manova found that the effect of valence (favourable vs 
unfavourable outcomes) upon spontaneous causal God attribution 
was significant at F 
Summary table(1) ) . 
Forced Choice Method 
28.79, p < .0001 (see Appendix D, Manova 
Similarly, God's causal influence was seen as greater in 
favourable than unfavourable outcome situations (figure 2b). A 
2x3 Manova found the effect of valence upon God's rated causal 
influence was F = 69.41, p < .0001 (Appendix D, table(2) ) . 
For Hypothesis 3: 
Attributions to the Devil only occur £or un£avourable 
outcomes. 
Spontaneous Method 
Only 3 people spontaneously attributed any outcomes to the 
Devil's power. All attributions occurred for the unfavourable 
outcomes, as predicted. Attributions occurred in all three 
situation domains; medical, emotional and interpersonal 
situations, but this result has little if any generalisability 
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power since only 3 subjects spontaneously attributed to the 
Devil. 
Forced Choice Method 
As figure 3b indicates, there was a significant difference 
in Devil attribution for favourable vs. unfavourable outcomes 
occurring in the predicted direction (Valence F = 56.3, p << 
.0001 - Appendix D, table(3) ) . However, causal attribution to 
the Devil did also occur for favourable outcomes, which is not 
predicted by hypothes 3. Moreover, 47 subjects (.64 of the 
sample} thought the Devil causally contributed to any of the 
outcome situations. 
There was also a significant multivariate situation domain 
effect for the Devil as a perceived cause (Domain F = 17.1, p < 
.0001, which is corroborated by the univariate average test). 
Greatest Devil attribution occurred in the emotional domain 
scenarios while the interpersonal domain produced the lowest 
Devil attribution ratings. A signi cant Domain x Valence 
interation effect for Devil ratings exists (F = 12. 6, p < 
.0001), which on further inspection reveals that causal 
attribution to the Devil is comparatively low for the 
medical-negative scenario. 
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For Hypothesis 4: 
Attributions to God are stronger in Medica~ than 
Emotiona~ or Interpersona~ situations. 
Spontaneous Method 
Spontaneous God attributions did vary as a function of 
Situation Domain (see figure 1c) . Signi cant multivariate 
differences were evident as F = 9. 21, p < . 001 (Appendix D 
table(1)) The pattern of variation was not the one predicted 
however. Although figure 1c indicates that more spontaneous 
causal God attributions were produced in the Medical scenarios 
the difference is not significant at the . 05 level. One 
unequivocal result though, is that significantly fewer God 
attributions were produced in the Interpersonal situations than 
the other domains. Both difference contrasts reached high 
significance (p < .0001). 
Significant multivariate and univariate effects for Domain x 
Valence {multivariate F = 3.2, p = .0001) were found. The most 
important contrast noted the differences between Emotional x 
Valence and Medical x Valence distributions (F = 10.1, p =.001). 
Figure 1a highlights the relatively high attribution mean for 
the Medical-Negative scenario compared to the other negative 
scenarios. 
Forced Choice Method 
As expected, causal attributions varied as a function of 
situation domain 2c) . 
p = .001 (Appendix D (2) 
The multivariate F equalled 7.55 
) . Again as hypothesised, God 
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attributions were stronger in Medical than in the Emotional or 
Interpersonal situations (F 11.18, p = .001). There was no 
significant difference between emotional or interpersonal 
situations with respect to causal attribution at p = .05. 
A Domain x Valence multivariate interaction effect of F = 
3.14 was significant only at the 
Medical-Negative scenario produced 
.05 level: 
relatively high 
The 
God 
attribution ratings compared to the other negative scenarios. 
For Hypothesis 5: 
All the religious belie£ scales positively correlate 
with causal God attribution. The frequency o£ God's 
personal influence and the belie£ that God directly 
intervenes in one's lire are the best predictors o£ 
causal God attribution. 
Spontaneous Method 
This hypothesis is partially supported. The correlation 
mat x (Appendix C (1) gives the bivariate correlation 
coefficients between religious scale and spontaneous attribution 
scores. An overall picture of the correlations suggests that 
the religious scales have medium correlations (of around r=.4) 
with spontaneous causal God attribution. Correlations do not 
vary greatly from scale to scale. The one exception is the 
scale measuring the bel f that God's predestined plan 
determines the outcome of all events which did not correlate 
with spontaneous causal God attribution. .Q..5. also had low 
correlations with the other religious scales. The Religious 
Comfort scale had most in common with the universal 
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predestination belief. 
According to simple coefficients, the two scales that 
correlated most highly with total spontaneous causal God 
attribution were Salience-Cognition (r = .49, p = .0001) and 
Religious Comfort Beliefs (r .48, p = .0001). This result is 
contrary to predictions. 
The multiple correlations essentially corroborate the simple 
coefficient results. Stepwise analysis indicated that Salience: 
Cognition accounted for the greatest unique variance of the 
causal God Attribution Tendency. Religious comfort was the only 
other scale to have any significant unique correlation with 
"the spontaneous attribution tendency". Table 3 below, 
provides Beta values. 
Table 3. 
Hultiple Correlations of Religious scale scores with Total 
Spontaneous Causal God Attributions 
Scale 
STEP 1: Salience: Cognition 
STEP 2: Religious Comfort 
~ 
.481 
. 2 90 
F Change 
21.3, p < .0001 
5.1, p = .05 
Hypothesis 5 is not confirmed for spontaneous attributions. 
Forced Choice Method 
The second correlation matrix (Appendix C (2) displays 
bivariate Gorrelations between each subjects Total Forced Choice 
God Attribution, and the religious scales. The consistent trend 
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is of moderate to high correlations at around r = • 65 (p < 
.0001). The universal predestination item (~), and the scales 
measuring God images correlated at relatively low levels of 
under r = .35 (p = .001) with forced choice God attributions. 
Appendix C2 shows that the items measuring the frequency of 
God's personal influence {~), and God as a direct personal 
intervener (Q2) correlated most highly with the Forced Choice 
attribution tendency of all the scales. 
Multiple correlations confirm this finding (see table 4 below) . 
Table 4. 
Hult~le Correlations of Beligious Scale Scores with 
Total Forced Choice God Attributions 
Scale 
STEP 1: .Ql 
STEP 2: Q2. 
STEP 3: .Q.1 
kt.a. 
.704 
.429 
.232 
F Change 
64.9, p << .0001 
18.3, p .0001 
4.3, p .05 
The exact predictions of hypothesis 5 are confirmed for forced 
choice attribution. The scales developed in this thesis to 
measure the personal perception of how, and how often God 
influences oneself are the best individual predictors of the 
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forced choice God attribution tendency. M scales God's 
influence in one's life through "the Word of God" {usually 
understood as The Bible) and is the next most powerful 
individual predictor. 
For Hypothesis 6: 
Loving God 
attribution 
image positively 
for positive outcomes. 
Spontaneous Attributions 
correlates with God 
Causal Attributions to God 'appear' to be moderated by God 
Image according to the simple correlations {Table 5.). 
Table 5. 
Correlations between God Image Factors and Spontaneous 
Causal God Attribution 
God Inage Factor 
Loving God 
Punishing God 
Personal God 
Omni God 
t Outcome 
.342 *** 
.235 * 
.362 *** 
.331 *** 
(p: * .05; ** = .01; *** 
Outcome Total Outcomes 
.243 ** .383 *** 
n.s. .255 * 
.187 * .383 *** 
n.s. .369 * 
.001; **** . 0001) 
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Generally God image had a low to medium correlation with 
attribution to God for the outcomes, but when variance from King 
and Hunt's (1972) religiosity scales (Devotional ism and 
Salience Cognition) is controlled for, no partial correlation 
relationship exists. Therefore, one's God image per se does not 
affect spontaneous God attribution according to the statistical 
results. Instead it is assumed religiosity is the more 
important determinant of religious attribution. 
However, as predicted, subjects who see God as loving did 
attribute a greater number of outcomes to God than those who did 
not consider God to be so lo~ing. The qualification of this 
result is that those who see God as loving also attributed 
more outcomes to God in negative outcome situations than those 
who did not see God as loving. In other words, if people see 
God as very loving they will be likely to say God is responsible 
for both positive and negative outcome situations. Furthermore, 
this relationship is not greatly moderated by a punishing image 
of God: partial correlation of Loving God scores with God 
attribution scores (controlling for Punishing God) gave r = 
.312, p < .01 for the positive outcomes and 
for the negative outcomes. 
Forced Choice Method 
r = .192, p = .05 
The same findings with respect to hypothesis 6 were evident 
using the rating method of obtaining attribution scores. In 
fact, the pattern and strength of correlations virtually 
duplicated the spontaneous correlations given in Table 5. Again 
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religiosity accounted for much of the God image variance with 
respect to causal attribution, and again there were positive 
correlations between a Loving God image and both favourable and 
unfavourable outcome attributions. 
One interesting difference between the two methods' results is 
that the attribution to God scores did not significantly 
correlate with an omni God concept: That is, God is primarily 
seen as omniscient, omnipresent and all powerful by subjects 
regardless of their tendency towards religious attribution. 
For Hypothesis 7: 
One's punishing God image positive~y corre~ates with God 
attribution for negative outcomes. 
For both methods there were no significant correlations 
between those who held a punishing God image and attribution to 
God in unfavourable outcome situations (Table 5) . Nobody in the 
sample viewed God as being more punishing than loving, and the 
correlation between a loving and punishing image was moderately 
high at r = • 44 7 (p < . 0001) . All these findings provide 
indications that dyadic (or complementary) loving God and 
punishing God images contain similar components of religiosity. 
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For Hypothesis 8: 
An active personal God image positively corrrelates with 
God attribution. 
In the same fashion as the loving God image relationship with 
God attribution, small pos ive correlations existed for 
positive, negative and combined situation outcomes (Table 5) . 
No relationship existed when Hunt and King's religios y 
dimensions were controlled for. These findings apply for both 
the forced choice and spontaneous response methods. 
For Hypothesis 9: 
Younger subjects produce stronger causal God 
attributions than older subjects. 
Spontaneous Method 
The younger subjects spontaneously attributed more outcomes to 
God than older subjects, as hypothesised. This effect was 
marginal at r = -.210 (p .05). When subjects were grouped as 
either young or old, and included as a between variables factor 
in the Manova no significant situation differences arose (see 
Appendix D, table (1) ) . 
The only other age effect was that older subjects were 
slightly more prone to believe God's personal influence 
through universal predestination (~), as r = .195 {p . 05) . 
No age effect was evident when the forced choice method was 
used. 
72 
For Hypothesis 10: 
Females produce stronger causal God attributions than 
males. 
There were no significant sex differences using either 
methodology, though the trend was in the predicted direction. 
An interesting find was that females tended to see God as 
predetermining all events more so than males (The oneway anova F 
equalled 4.4, p .01). 
4.2 Natural ys. Sypernatural Causation 
Gorsuch and Smiths' (1983) results gave limited support for a 
"God in the Gaps" theory of attribution style, which postulates 
that people attribute events to God only when no natural causes 
are seen as responsible. My results also give part 1 support 
to a moderated "God in the Gaps" attribution style. 
Forced Choice Attribution 
There appeared to be two types of attribution, as there was a 
small negative relationship between attribution to the "natural" 
causes of luck and self with supernatural attribution (-.314, p 
= .001 and -.25, p = .01 respectively). Causal attribution to 
God did not correlate with attribution to either other people or 
fate. In fact, attribution to fate only correlated with 
attribution to luck, although very highly (r = .661, p < .0001). 
Further support for a God in the Gaps attribution style is 
noted, as distinct natural vs. supernatural patterns of 
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attribution appeared. Attributions to the natural causes 
"luck", "others", "self", positively intercorrelated. 
Attributions to the religious supernatural causes of "God" and 
"the Devil" also positively intercorrelated at a high level of 
r = .665 (p < .0001). 
Spontaneous attributions to natural and supernatural causation 
confirm the forced choice results above and although 
correlations are generally lower, natural vs. supernatural 
causation patterns were very similar 
4.3 God ys. the Deyil as Causal Agents 
Spontaneous attributions to the Devil were very rare, but 
forced choice attribution to the Devil was much more frequent. 
Three relevant forced choice trends are outlined below: 
1. Those who saw God as an important cause also tended to 
rate the Devil as a significant but lesser cause (r = .655, 
p < .0001). The mean average rating for God as a cause is M 
3.2 (a slight to moderate cause), compared to the Devil at 
M = 2.0 (a very slight cause). 
2. Situation differences between God and Devil attribution were 
strong. God was seen as more influential in determining 
positive outcomes than 
the Devil was seen as 
the 
more 
Devil. , 
influential 
Conversely, 
than God in 
determining negative outcomes, with the exception of the 
medical negative outcome. Patterns of God attribution 
between domain factors are reversed for Devil attribution. 
3. The above findings give rise to the question: Do the causal 
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attribution ratings to God and the Devil across different 
situations produce a supernatural attribution constant? 
Interestingly, this may be the case (see figure 4) although 
the interpersonal event-outcomes and the negative valence 
outcomes produce slightly fewer supernatural attributions. 
There was a tendency towards a constant God and Devil causal 
attribution effect across situation types. 
4.4 Spontaneous Causal Search and Complexity 
Spontaneous Causal Search 
Spontaneous causal questions and speculations as a reaction 
to crisis situations were manifestly prominent. The spontaneous 
coding category "Questions Concerning Cause" identified the 
subject's explicit questions that concerned the causal origin of 
the outcomes. 
Fifty six subjects (75% of the sample) spontaneously 
responded to the situations they were placed in by expressing 
their desire to find the cause(s) of the events and outcomes. 
Seventy one causal search questions were produced at an average 
of 1 per person, or .17 per person per scenario. The content of 
these questions ranged from the simple question; "Why me?" to 
more complex speculations involving the evaluation of possible 
causes, e.g. "Did God let me down or was this caused by Satan?"; 
"Is God working in their hearts?" or "How could I be so stupid?" 
The phrase "Why me?" appeared to be a popular and automatic 
reaction to negative outcomes. 
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Figure 5 clearly shows that Emotional situations incur about 
half as many causal search questions as Interpersonal or medical 
situations. This was the primary situation effect. 
Causa1 Comp1exity 
Causal complex y was identified by coding causal 
attributions and reasoning that went beyond the simple 
attribution to a specific cause such as "oneself", ".G.Q.d" or 
"other people". 
Some attributed situations to abstract causes such as fate 
or probability. The individual's philosophy about causality was 
sometimes revealed: e.g. "These things just happen. It isn't 
really fate but it's just something you've got to cope with. 
They just happen." 
Attributions to abstract causes were not nearly as frequent 
as the attribution to a series of interrelated chains. Reasons 
and explanations for events were often produced through the 
linking of causes. In the following example the causes have 
been underlined: 
" after the break the refreshment gives ~ 
confidence and I decide to work hard ... it drags 
me down and before exams~ become anxious ... " 
The above example also lustrates a pervasive characteristic of 
subjects' causally complex thinking, namely that, outcomes were 
often attributed to much more specific causes than the general 
categories of "self", "others'' or "God". Thus, attributions to 
one's anxiety, confidence or even a refreshing break were 
significant and specific causal attributions. 
Figure 6 illustrates that spontaneous causal complexity was 
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significantly greater in Emotional than other domains. This is 
a complete reversal of the trend regarding causal search. 
4.5 Spontaneous attributions to God's Hand; 
God's Plan; God's Will; God's Control 
The phrase "attributions to God's Hand" is synonymous with 
the phrase "spontaneous causal attributions to God". These 
attributions are examined in the previous sections. The other 
spontaneous attribution categories, to God's, plan, will and 
control are considered to be of a different nature than 
attributions to God's hand. 
God's Plan or Purpose 
Attributions to God's plan or purpose are forms of intention 
attributions that usually appeared as a statement such as "I 
would accept this as part of God's plan". 
Fifteen people (20% of the sample) elicited 30 God's plan 
attributions in total. Two thirds were confidently stated and 
one third of these were tentative or speculative. Figure 7 
illustrates the patterns of these attributions across the 
situations encountered. No valence differences occurred but 
God's plan attributions to the medical negative scenario were 
easily the greatest. 
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God's Will 
Attributions to God's will may be equivalent to plan or 
purpose attributions, however they were coded separately. Here 
is an example of an attribution to God's will: "God must want 
this to happen". The terms such as "desire", "want", "will", 
"expect" were characteristic of an attribution to God's will, 
e.g. "God desires this"; "It's the Lords will" etc. 
Fourteen people (20% of the sample) attributed at least one 
outcome to God's will. Attributions to God's will showed 
similarit s to attributions to God's control and causal God 
attributions across the situations. Also notable situation 
differences with attributions to God's plan were evident: God's 
will was mostly invoked for the medical-positive outcome (figure 
8) whereas God's plan was mostly invoked for the 
medical-negative outcome (figure 7} . 
God's Control 
Attributions to God's control express the belief that God is 
in control. They are not specific to God's effect or 
intervention but emphasise a general belief or faith in God as 
"in control of things". One subject states: "I realise that 
whatever happens, the situation is up to God (Jesus) and he is 
in control". This type of global attribution was rare for the 
sample, as only 10 people (14% of the sample) attributed the 
situation to God's control. There were 
but all were clearly confident. 
of these attributions 
Even though there were only a few God control attributions, 
patterns across the situations were virtually the same as the 
attribution to God's Hand patterns (see figures 9 and la). In 
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addition, religious comfort beliefs and sectarianism gave the 
greatest religious scale correlations with attribution to God's 
control. 
4.6 Non Causal Religious Thinking 
The majority of religious thinking responses naturally fell 
into one or more of the designated categories: "Asking God's 
help"; "Thanking God"; " A Change or confirmation of faith and 
relationship with God"; "God's reasons" behind the 
event-outcomes. Subjects tended to ask God's help and thank God 
far more than they expressed the status of their religious faith 
or speculated upon God's reasons. 
Asking God's Hel.p 
Fourty two people (57% of the sample) spontaneously asked 
for God's help giving a total of 171 requests. Examples were: 
"Please God let me live a little longer!" and "I pray for 
guidance to help me through this time". 
Figure 10 illustrates that fewer requests for help resulted 
in Emotional than in other domains. The religious scales that 
correlated most highly with the request for God's help were; 
.Q.! "God's Word" as personal influence, r = .4225, p < .0001; 
Ql - Frequency of God's influence, r .4101, p < .0001; 
One's control of God by prayer, r = .4012, p = .0001. 
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Thanking God 
Fourty seven subjects (64% of the sample) thanked God. 
There were 149 thanking God statements. Virtually all of the 
thanking God statements were also coded as implied causal 
attributions to God's Hand, therefore patterns across the 
different situations were similar for the categories of 
"thanking God" and "attribution to God's Hand". However one 
dissimilarity was that the medical domain scenarios produced far 
more thanking God statements than the emotional or interpersonal 
domains (figure 11) . 
Thanking God statements had most in common with one's 
Control of God by prayer, Reli~ious comfort and the frequency of 
God's personal influence (Ql). Correlations with these scales 
were all in the vicinity of r = .500, p < .0001. 
Religious Faith and Relationship with God 
Thirty two subjects (43% of the sample) elicited 90 such 
thoughts in total. These thoughts concerned the status of the 
subjects' religious faith or their relationship with God or 
Jesus, for example: 
"I guess, to have gone that far I would have had 
to lose faith in God, I should repent, and try to 
find my way back into His will." 
also 
"God has deserted me ... " 
Some of these thoughts imply that the subject was causally 
attributing the outcome to a loss of faith in God, or in some 
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cases to God's inaction. Other thoughts reflected a 
glorification of God, and closer personal bond between God and 
the subject, due to the situation outcome turning out all right. 
Notable variation across the situations was evident. 
Interpersonal scenarios elicited very few faith or God 
relationship statements (refer to figure 12) The devotionalism 
scale and the belief in direct personal intervention were most 
important for subjects who spontaneously linked their religious 
faith or relationship with God to the crisis situations. 
God's Reasons 
This religious coding category encompassed attributions to 
God's reasons behind the outcomes, as well as attributions to 
God's plan. There were few people who went beyond the 
attribution of God's plan to speculate upon what God's plan was, 
It was more common for subjects just to attribute unspecified 
meaning and purpose to event-outcomes, as in the following: 
"I'd accept that maybe God allowed this to occur 
in order that something good come of it - but 
goodness knows what!" 
God's plan or rationale behind unfavourable outcomes was 
sometimes speculated upon. The speculation generally reflected 
the subjects positive outlook and God's altruistic motives, 
rather than a form of punishment by God. For example: 
"Maybe God wants me to help and counsel other 
paraplegics". 
Sixty eight God rationalisation speculations were produced 
by 28 subjects (40% of the sample). The medical domain elicited 
the greatest number of speculations (figure 13) , and in a 
similar vein to statements that give thanks to God, the 
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religious scales of Control by prayer. Reli~ious comfort and Q1 
- (the frequency of God's personal influence in life) correlated 
most highly with attribution to God's reasons. 
4.7 Spontaneous ys. Forced Choice Causal 
God Attribution 
A synopsis of the findings is included below. Statistical 
comparisons of spontaneous causal attributions (produced by the 
thought lListing probe) with forced choice causal attributions 
(elicited by the rating of experimenter defined causes) are 
summarised. 
Direct Correlations 
The attributions for the forced choice categories were 
correlated with their spontaneous counterparts. That is, the 
tendency to spontaneously attribute to a causal category was 
compared with the tendency to attribute to that causal category 
using the forced choice method. 
The correlations between the two methods for all the structured 
causal categories are displayed in table 6: 
Table 6. Spontaneous ys. Forced Choiqe 
Attribution Correlations 
God = . 3406, (p . 001) 
Self .2754 (p . 01) 
Luck .2921 (p < .01) 
Fate .3059 (p < . 01) 
Others = n. s. (p . 05) 
Devil = n.s. (p = .05) 
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The correlations were quite low, with definite differences 
between spontaneous and forced choice attribution to other 
people. Similarly, the amount of causal attribution to the Devil 
largely depended upon the method used to gauge attributions. 
Attribution to God was most consistent across methodologies 
for the interpersonal situations (r = .430, p < .0001) and for 
the positive situations (r = .3600, p < .001). 
In addition to the correlation coe cients above, the two 
methods were compared by seeing if those subjects who rated God 
as having some causal effect on any of the outcomes (using the 
forced choice format) also spontaneously attributed to God. 
Cross tabulations indicated that 63 subjects causally attributed 
to God using the forced choice method whereas only 36 of these 
spontaneously attributed to God. Two subjects spontaneously 
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attributed to God without rating God as having any causal 
influence while only 4 subjects gave no attribution to God of 
any sort. According to the uncertainty co-efficient which 
evaluates nominal association, it must be concluded that we can 
not confidently predict that a subject spontaneously attributed 
to God, just from the knowledge that she rated God as having 
some influence. 
However if is known that the subject rated God as 
causally responsib to a moderate extent (averaging for all 
the situations M = 3.0 =to a moderate extent) we can be much 
more confident in the prediction that the subject spontaneously 
attributed to God. In addition, subjects who rated God's causal 
influence below this threshold level tended not to spontaneously 
attribute to God. The uncertainty coefficient of .107 and a 
Lambda value of .322 were obtained. These statistics scale the 
accuracy of predicting whether a subject has spontaneously 
attributed to God, purely from a knowledge that his/her forced 
choice score lies above or below the threshold level. 
Distribution Differences 
There were positive skews for most attribution to God 
distributions. This skew was far more pronounced for 
spontaneous attributions to God because a non response was 
treated as a valid interval scale score. The non response 
represented zero attributions. Many subjects did not 
spontaneously attribute to God at all, therefore a large number 
of non responses were coded. For this reason problems due to 
the excessive positive skew made data analysis and 
interpretation difficult tasks. 
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interpretation difficult tasks. 
Situation differences were more pronounced for spontaneous 
God attributions (compare figure la with 2a) . This situation 
difference exaggeration was also evident for spontaneous 
attribution to any source. It is the nature of the spontaneous 
responses (or the nature of the coding) which determined the 
large situation differences. It was also interesting that far 
more spontaneous attributions to all sources occurred in 
emotional situations than in other domains. 
Forced Choice vs. Spontaneous God attribution 
Hypothesis results 
1. A very large difference in attribution to the supernatural 
was that only three people spontaneously noted the Devil as 
a probable cause of any of the situation outcomes yet 
47 people rated the Devil as being to some extent causally 
influential in any outcome when they were provided with a 
rating scale. 
2. The religious scales from Part 2 that correlated most 
highly with spontaneous attribution were not the same ones 
that correlated most highly with forced choice attribution. 
Religious Comfort Beliefs and Religious Cognitive Salience 
had the most in common with spontaneous causal God 
attribution (to God's hand) whereas the more direct items of 
Q1. and Q2 gave the best account of forced choice causal 
God attribution. 
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Section 4. 6 Summary 
Differences between spontaneous and forced choice 
attributions, such the as weak although generally significant 
correlat and seemingly inconsistent attribution responses 
were important findings. Religious cognitive salience, prayer 
and comfort provided by religion were most important for 
spontaneous God attribution, but the more direct scales 
concentrating upon the mode and amount God's influence tended 
to reflect forced choice causal God attribution. Despite some 
distribution differences the patterning of attributions remained 
reasonably static across methodology. 
CUAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION OF BESULTS 
5.1 Spontaneous Causal Attributions to God and the 
Devil 
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The results provide strong evidence that a significant 
number of Christians do spontaneously attribute certain personal 
event-outcomes to God. Just over half the sample invoked God 
as a cause of one or more outcomes. Further, the number of 
spontaneous causal attributions to God were far greater than the 
number of spontaneous attributions to other people, luck, fate, 
or the Devil. There were slightly more spontaneous attributions 
to oneself than to God. These findings emphasise that for 
certain personal outcomes, God may be seen as an important cause 
by many Christians. 
In contrast to the above result, spontaneous causal 
attributions to the Devil were only elicited by three of the 
seventy four subjects. Attribution to the D 1 in the 
situations described by the scenario is therefore considered as 
a significant phenomenon for only a very small and select group 
of subjects. Further work is needed to determine the 
dispositional factors that lead to Devil attributions. 
The paucity of spontaneous attributions to the Devil 
indicates that the Devil was not cognitively salient in the 
minds of the majority of subjects (see Pryor and Kriss 1977 for 
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a discussion of salience and the attribution process) . Either 
subjects did not view the Devil as an important cause of any 
outcomes, or they did not think about the Devil at all. When 
the Devil was made more salient by the presentation of the 
causal scale ("the Devil") attributions to the Devil were more 
frequent. 
It was interesting that for those who attributed to both the 
Devil and to God, each outcome tended to be explained as 
resulting from a constant amount of supernatural (God+the Devil) 
causation. The amount of supernatural attribution was very 
similar for all situations. The implication is that, for many 
of the subjects, God and the Devil are seen as having a certain 
amount of influence on important events in their lives. 
However, an important qualification is that only when the Devil 
was suggested as a possible cause of important events in one's 
life (or only when the Devil concept is made particularly 
salient) was the amount of supernatural attribution similar for 
all these life events. It is possible that this finding is 
purely an artifact of the forced choice method used to scale 
attributions. 
An alternative, although less likely explanation, is that 
many subjects attributed outcomes to the Devil but did not list 
these attributions because they considered Devil attributions to 
be inappropriate for the aims of the investigation. If this was 
the case, then the thought listing method failed to elicit open 
spontaneous thoughts.· However, many of the subjects listed 
thoughts that appeared to give very open and detailed accounts 
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of their personal beliefs. Moreover, there does not seem to be 
a good reason why subjects would think it inappropriate to list 
Devil attributions but appropriate to list God attributions. 
5.2 Forced Choice ys. Spontaneous Methodology 
In contrast to the small number of spontaneous Devil 
attributions, forced choice attribution to the Devil was a much 
more significant phenomenon. The reason for this difference 
most likely stems from the nature of the two methods. 
Once a causal scale such as "the Devil" is presented to the 
subjects, the the concept of the Devil becomes more salient in 
the minds and therefore they are more likely to attribute to 
the Devil. Pryor and Kriss (1977), Taylor and Fiske (1977) and 
Reyes et al (1980) found that the greater the salience of a 
possible causal agent, the greater the attribution to that 
source. Subjects may also have thought that the experimenter 
expected them to rate the Devil as a cause for some outcomes, 
hence they may have exaggerated their perception of the Devil's 
influence. This suggests an inherent weakness in the forced 
choice scales, that the forced choice method is too direct to 
capture subjects' spontaneous attributions. 
Although forced choice causal attributions were compared 
with spontaneous causal attributions it was not possible to 
determine the validity of the forced choice method. 
Correlations between attributions for the two methods were low. 
This is partly due to the number of spontaneous attributions not 
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being an accurate measure of the perceived extent of causal 
influence. It is also possible that certain causes were 
attributed to the outcomes but not considered as important 
causes, hence the attribution was not listed. It is unlikely 
that subjects listed every thought that came into the heads. 
It could be that potential causes have to be at a certain 
threshold level of importance or salience before they are 
perceived as causing an event. 
For those subjects who spontaneously attributed outcomes to 
God, the three factors of religious comfort, cogn ive salience 
of God, and prayer seem to be very important. These factors 
gave the best account of variance contained in the spontaneous 
God attribution scores. In contrast, it was the belief that God 
frequently and directly intervenes in one's life that best 
accounted for forced choice attribution to God. 
This difference between forced choice and spontaneous God 
attribution not easily explained (although, two possibilities 
arise:) 
First , it is plausible that the two methods were not 
measuring exactly the same variable. The number of spontaneous 
attributions to God may have been most indicative of the 
importance of personal prayer, the importance of God, and the 
comfort provided by the belief that God is looking after 
oneself. The number of spontaneous God attributions, however, 
might not have been such a good indicator of the extent of 
causal influence ascribed to God. It could be that the forced 
choice task provided a better measure of the extent of causal 
influence ascribed to God because subjects were 
directed to rate this variable. 
90 
explic ly 
Secondly, the cognitive salience of religion accounted for a 
large proportion of the spontaneous God attribution variance. 
The importance and impact of God to the subjects largely 
determined whether subjects would spontaneously invoke God as a 
cause for any of the outcomes. 
5. 3 Confidence of Spontaneous Causal Attributions to God 
Clear and confident spontaneous attributions to God were far 
more common than tentative or speculative attributions (Over 
90% of the attributions were clear and confident) . It is not 
clear whether the confidence of the attributions reflects a 
general attributional style, the religiosity of the subjects, or 
the nature of the situations attributed to God. It was found, 
however, that spontaneous causal God attribution correlated most 
highly with the scales that measured the belief that God would 
answer a personal prayer, and the comfort provided by religion. 
These two factors may produce confident rather than tentative 
attributions. Further analysis is needed to test this 
possibility. 
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5.4 Valence of the Eyent Outcome and God Image 
Evidence from previous research indicates that God's causal 
influence is seen as greater for favourable outcomes than for 
unfavourable outcomes. Both the spontaneous and forced choice 
God attributions follow this pattern. 
Although the effect of outcome valence on internal 
attributions (attributions to self) has been vigorously 
researched (Wong and Weiner 1981), the reasons why favourable 
outcomes should produce the greatest amount of God attribution 
has not been examined. This phenomenon is compatible with 
several explanations. 
Firstly, people may not want to blame God for 
negative-unfavourable outcomes because this expresses a 
disatisfaction with God's actions. To defy God's will may seem 
an unnatractive for many Christians (Spilka and Schmidt 1983) . 
Secondly, people may not like to think that God who is in 
control is responsible for a large number of negative outcomes. 
They may then feel that they have little control over any 
negative consequences that occur in the future. This second 
possibilty is derived from Walster's(1966) "defensive-protective 
hypothesis" (Ritzema 1979) . 
Thirdly, following Heider's ( 1958) account of balance 
theory, someone who holds positive sentiments towards God will 
tend to relate positive outcomes with God (Ritzema 1979). 
A fourth possibility, and one that is similar to the balance 
theory account is simply that people will attribute outcomes 
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that are compatible with their God image. Thus, those who 
strongly believe in a loving God, but not in a punishing God, 
will attribute outcomes to God that are expressive of His loving 
character, that is, the favourable-positive outcomes. 
Conversely, a punishing God image is linked to 
unfavourable-negative events and so cognitive dissonance may be 
avoided in this way. Only this God image account is examined 
here. 
Benson and Spilka (1973), Pargament and Hahn (1986), Roof 
and Roof (1984) note that God tends to viewed in loving rather 
than punishing or vindictive terms. God was viewed as more 
loving than punishing by all subjects in the present New Zealand 
student sample and it could well be that this view is 
representative of a large proportion of New Zealanders. Peters 
(1986) summarised results from an Australian survey: 
"Eight out of ten Australians believed in God, most of them 
regarded him as a Good mate who helped out in times of 
trouble ... Only 7.5% of the survey sampled saw God as cold 
judgemental or stern." 
This trend most likely dominates for the New Zealand public 
also. 
A Punishing God image did not correlate with God 
attributions for negative outcomes. This result is contr.ary to 
the God image account of attribution to God. Instead, the 
loving and punishing God image factors appeared to reflect 
general religiosity, and thus do not explain why attribution to 
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God was greatest for positive outcomes. God image factors were 
all positively correlated with each other, and moreover, they 
did not correlate with God attribution when religiosity variance 
was controlled for. Other research has noted that God images 
are not strong determinants of conceptual style (Sternberg 
1979) . Similarly, God image factors appear to be saturated with 
religiosity components (Fisher et al 1986; Spilka Hood and 
Gorsuch 1985) 
religiosity, 
findings. 
Considering God image factors as dimensions of 
may instead be a pertinent way to explain the 
It is concluded that loving or punishing God images per se 
~controlled for religiosity) have little effect on the amount or 
strength of attribution for positive or negative situations. 
God images may function in more subtle ways (Brown 1984) . 
They may also be of greater consequence amongst particular 
sectarian groups (Nelsen et al 1973). It was found in the 
present investigation that the older female subjects who held 
sectarian views tended to stress the punishing nature of God. 
Potvin ( 197 7) noted the same trend. The reasons why most 
attributions to God occur for positive outcomes rather than for 
negative outcomes needs further attention. 
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5.5 Domain of the Situation 
Attribution to God was affected by the domain of the 
situations. 
Other research has indicated that the health domain is a 
fertile area for God attributions to take place (Pargament and 
Hahn 1986) . In general, previous research findings were 
corroborated. Forced choice attribution to God was strongest in 
medical situations. 
The subjects' des for control and search for meaning in 
the negative medical outcome (accident) may account for this 
result: severe physical ailment is often a serious threat to 
long term functioning, and sometimes one's existence. In order 
for subjects to find a sense of meaning or purpose for the 
health crisis, they attributed the unfavourable outcome to God's 
plan or purpose. The empirical results of this study confirmed 
that spontaneous attribution to God's purpose or plan, and the 
reasons for the events attributed to God were most frequent in 
the medical domain. This is despite the fact, that spontaneous 
attributions to God's hand were slightly more frequent in the 
emotional domain and, in fact, the emotional domain produced the 
greatest number of attributions to any source. 
The questionnaires were completed around exam time when the 
emotional scenarios were probably most relevant to subjects. 
In addition, the emotional situations described the subjects' 
failiure in a familiar University setting. These two 
context factors could explain the large amount of general 
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attributional activity in the emotional domain. 
One assumption is that attributions to God's purpose or 
plan, and the reasons for events attributed to God allow greater 
meaning to be obtained than mere causal attributions to God. 
This implies that subjects faced with a health crisis attempted 
to find meaning in the events by attributing to God's plan or 
purpose. Their further speculations of God's reasons behind 
the events also suggests they were searching for meaning. The 
function of God in providing meaning appeared to be greatest 
these health situations. Therefore, empirical support is 
given that the importance of meaning provided by God, is 
greatest when experiencing a physical health crisis. 
The need to predict and control a health crisis may also be 
great. Personal control in such situations is often limited and 
people may feel they are at the mercy of doctors or other 
external forces. It is possible that subjects believed they 
could gain some control over their unpleasant physical state by 
attributing the medical events to God. Subjects who believed 
their petitionary prayers to God would be causally cacious 
may have felt that they have some control over the outcome. The 
Control of God by Prayer scale correlated relatively highly with 
spontaneous attribution to God's hand, as did other i terns 
concerning the importance of prayer and comfort. A .likely 
explanation for these results is that the Control of God by 
Prayer scale measures the importance of prayer in providing 
comfort in times of stress. That is, the scale is not so 
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indicative of the bel f that one can control God by prayer. 
The "Control of God by Prayer" scale correlated highly with 
other personal prayer and comfort items, which provides further 
evidence for this explanation. 
cognitive response set to 
Subjects may well have invoked a 
answer many of the questions 
concerning prayer. Therefore, the individual items concerned 
with prayer may have been treated more as a group than as 
individual items. Fisher et al (1986) describes this as the 
"Halo-effect". Despite this tendency, there were some comments 
from subjects such as, " If I asked God to help me cope with 
things, God would help me 11 • They qualified this belief by 
adding; "but not always in the way I expect 11 • Hence, 
petitionary prayer may be based upon a general faith that "God 
will help somehow" rather than the specific belief that certain 
events can be manipulated through petitionary prayer. 
In conclusion: firstly, it would appear from the results 
that the function of petitionary prayer in times of crisis is 
not so much to personally control God (and thus control the 
outcomes), but is more to provide comfort and security in times 
of stress. Comfort and security provided by God are 
particularly important for those people who pray to God for help 
when experiencing a health crisis. In this sense God 
attributions may function as an aid to coping. 
Secondly, attributions to God's purpose or plan function to 
provide meaning to those who experience a stressful health 
crisis. The acquisition of meaning or purpose through God 
attribution may also function to aid coping. 
5.6 Attribution to God: A Religiosity Component 
of Religious Belief Systems 
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Attribution to divine intervention was a good indicator of 
religiosity. Two of King and Hunt's (1972) religiosity 
dimensions (Salience: Cognition, and Devotionalism) correlated 
quite highly with both spontaneous and forced choice causal 
attribution to God an the correlations were higher than those 
obtained by Ritzema (1979) . 
The other religious scales also positively correlated with 
God attribution which reaffirms Ritzema's (1979) and Gorsuch and 
Smith's (1983) contention that attribution to God is an 
important component of religiosity. 
Age and Sex 
The God attribution trends followed the religiosity trends 
confirmed in a number of previous studies. God attribution was 
slightly greater for girls than for boys but only marginally so. 
Younger subjects were more inclined towards God attribution 
although this trend was not statistically significant. It was 
postulated that these age and sex trends are due to differences 
in religiosity but this need not be the case. Previous research 
shows that females tend to be more attributionally complex than 
males (Fletcher et al 1986) . The female subjects may have thus 
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been more inclined to elicit causal attributions. Possibly 
female subjects produced more attributions than males because 
they were more easily influenced by their perceptions of the 
experimenters aims. Sex and influencibility is a controversial 
issue (Eagly 1978; Eagly and Carli 1981) . 
5.7 Supernatural ys. Natural Causation 
It is suggested by the author that people attempt to find 
meaning, a sense of security and comfort by attributing 
happenings to God that are not easily controlled by oneself, 
for example, terminal cancer; thus attribution in medical events 
may function for these purposes. 
In this study God was seen as having more control over these 
situations than oneself. However, there was a large amount of 
attribution to both God and self for the emotional domain 
situations. A "God in the Gaps theory" of attribution dictates 
that God is only used to explain an outcome when natural causes 
do not explain it (Gorsuch and Smith 1983). Clearly then, 
this rather unsophisticated "God in the Gaps 11 theory of 
attribution does not account for the large amount of attribution 
to both natural causes and to God in the emotional domain 
situations. 
The results suggest that a moderated version of the ,God in 
the Gaps theory may account for the relationship between 
attribution to God and attribution to natural causes; that is, 
despite some situations producing much attribution to both 
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natural and supernatural causes, the overall correlation between 
attribution to natural sources and attribution to God was 
negative. Furthermore, the total forced choice attribution to 
God and the Devil correlated negatively with forced choice 
attribution to the natural causes of self, other people, and 
luck. Hence, there was a general tendency for attribution to 
both God and the Devil (the supernatural) where natural causes 
were not seen as important. 
Bourque and Back (1971) argue that those who possess a 
religious language can describe and explain mystical 
experiences, whereas those who do not have a religious language 
find certain mystical experiences difficult to explain. In a 
similar fashion, many of those who have a religious belief 
system usually can explain events that are not easy to explain 
by natural phenomena. Although the characteristics or context 
of the events are important determinants of religious 
attributions, ultimately it is the salience and availability of 
of a religious belief system that determines whether events will 
be attributed to religious sources. The concepts of salience 
and avaliability are discussed by Taylor and Fiske (1975), and 
Reyes et al (1980). 
100 
5.8 Causal Search and Complexity 
The process of attribution is not always instant (Smith and 
Miller 1983). According to (Hastie 1984) causal search is most 
likely when the outcome is negative and unexpected. The results 
of the present study convey the importance of causal search for 
unexpected and negative outcomes. The majority of the sample 
listed at least one causal search question. and the most common 
response to the negat situation was, "Why me?". "Why me?" 
was usually the first thought listed and thus is probably a 
fairly automatic reaction to the events. From analysing the 
spontaneous scripts it was evident that this question often 
expressed subjects' frustration and distress, as well as a 
search for reasons why the negative outcome happened to them. 
There were also several more complex questions involving God's 
role in events, for example: "Is God working in their hearts?". 
A relevant finding was that outcomes that were seen as 
being caused by oneself, tended to produce causally complex 
thinking but not so much causal searching, while outcomes that 
were seen more as a result of external causes gave the opposite 
pattern. Exactly why these patterns occurred is not clear, 
athough it is probable that causally complex thinking helped 
subjects to explain the reasons behind their failiure or success 
once an internal attribution was made. 
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5.9 Spontaneous attributions to God's Will. Plan. 
Control. and Religious Thinking in a Crisis 
Subjects did not only causally attribute events to God, but 
also attributed events to God's will, general control, plan or 
purpose. 
Attributions to God's control over events were not specific 
to a particular outcome. Instead they were global or general 
attributions that tended to be phrased as statements similar to, 
"God is in control". The religious comfort scale correlated 
highly with attributions to God's control which indicates that 
the faith or belief that God is in control of events provides 
comfort. In general though there was strong evidence to suggest 
that spontaneous global attributions to God's control function 
the same way as spontaneous causal attributions to specific 
events. They both help to provide comfort in times of stress. 
Attributions to God's will, plan, and the attributions of 
reasons (behind the outcome) to God all provide the subjects 
with meaning in response to a serious crisis. Each one of these 
meaning ascriptions seems to have individual significance: 
Attributions to God's plan, and the speculation of God's reasons 
indicated a search for meaning in times of stress, while 
attributions to God's will tended not to indicate a search for 
meaning in times of stress. The majority of attributions to 
God's will tended to occur for the medical-positive outcome, for 
example, one subject wrote: "God must have wanted me to live." 
whereas the majority of attributions to God's plan and the 
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attribution of reasons to God occurred for the medical negative 
outcome, for example, "Why is God's plan in leaving me 
paralised" and "Maybe God wants me to counsel other 
paraplegics". Subjects speculated upon God's plan and reasons 
behind a negative outcome. In that sense, they searched for 
meaning and direction after the crisis has occurred. This 
further search for meaning and purpose in response to a crisis 
was not so evident for attributions to God's hand (causal 
attributions), God's will, and God's general control. 
Subjects also produced non attributional religious thoughts 
when freely responding to situations they were faced with. The 
thoughts were directed towards asking God's help, thanking God, 
and confirming the status of personal faith. Different aspects 
of a person's meaning belief system were important for these 
types of religious thoughts. This is evidenced by the 
correlations of the religious scales with the spontaneous 
religious thoughts. For example, "God's Word" (the Bible) was 
very important for those who spontaneously asked for God's help; 
while those who spontaneously thanked God, regarded the comfort 
provided by religion, and the belief that God would help them as 
important. For those who monitored the status of their 
religious faith and relationship with God, their closeness to 
God was most important to them. These results attest to the 
different types of religious thoughts that arise as. people 
experience a life crisis. Further work on the belief component 
correlates of such thinking is needed before the individual 
significance of each type of thought response can be clarified. 
5.9.5 Methodological Implications, and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
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This study has focussed upon the importance and characteristics 
of spontaneous attributions to God for Christian subjects who 
were faced with various hypothetical events, both favourable and 
unfavourable. They were asked to imagine that these events were 
really happening to them. 
In general, the results of previous research (that have used 
forced choice rating methods) have been supported. However, 
attributions need not be elicited through the reactive forced 
choice method: they may instead be captured through the 
spontaneous thought listing probe which provides an indirect 
method of capturing attributions. Fewer attributions are 
likely to be produced using the thought sting probe but they 
will be more indicative of the subjects' own cognitive structure 
and attributional thinking; for example, this study found that 
it was likely that attributions to the Devil (scaled by the 
forced choice method) were largely the result of methodological 
artifacts. The forced choice method probably increased the 
salience of the Devil, and also stuctured or led subjects to 
attribute outcomes to the Devil. 
The coding and statistical analysis of spontaneous responses 
is a more difficult and time consuming task than for forced 
choice designs but the problems of the indirect thought listing 
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probe appear to be outweighed by the benefits: 
Firstly, subjects are less likely to produce responses that 
are reactive to the method of investigation in spontaneous 
designs hence the external validity of the spontaneous response 
results is greater than results stemming from the rating of 
causes. 
Secondly, the spontaneous thoughts that a person lists are 
rich in content and meaning. This allows the investigator to 
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the complexities of 
cognitive reactions to events. 
Thirdly, 
individuals 
the cognitions that are 
in crisis are higlighted by 
most important to 
their spontaneous 
responses. The importance and integration of individuals' 
thoughts, attributions, and religious belief-meaning system 
components can thus be the focus of investigation; for 
instance, in the present study, the spontaneous method 
highlighted the importance of comfort, 
religion to those who spontaneously 
personal prayer and 
attributed to God. 
Furthermore, some subjects searched for meaning in their health 
crisis by speculating upon God's plan, purpose or reasons behind 
such an unfavourable situation. 
It is suggested that the above advantages outweigh the 
problems associated with coding, scaling and statistically 
analysing the spontaneous responses. 
The examination of people's spontaneous thinking and 
religious attributions in real life events would be more useful 
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than studying people's reactions to hypothetical scenarios. The 
indirect thought listing probe could be used to examine 
subjects' cognitions and attributions for events that have 
happenned to them. If it is not possible to study personally 
experienced events, the presentation of scenarios on video is 
an alternative method. A video may portray events in a more 
natural manner than do the written descriptions (Grigg 1986) . 
By encouraging a group of subjects watching the video to discuss 
freely their thoughts with others in the group1 interactions and 
normative factors that influence religious attributions can be 
analysed. The groups could be religious, non religious or of 
any composition. 
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Al?PE'l'IDIX Al. Questionnaire - Spontaneous thought listing tasl<. 
(Part 1) canpleted by subject 44 
Thesis for an MSc in Psychology 
Peter Van Dijk 
AIM OF EXERCISE 
Everyone thinks about particular events in their life in their 
own characteristic way. The purpose of this exercise is to 
find out how you would react to significant events in your 
own life. That is, what would go through your mind after 
being involved in a situation of importance to you? 
INSTRUCTIONS 
There are six different scenarios - (set of events, or stories). 
Please try and imaqine that the scenarios are real and that the 
events described are important to you. You are the main 
character, so the events in effect happen to you. 
Read the scenario then compl~te the task. If the same thought 
comes to mind in different scenarios write it down in any case. 
PLEASE BE AS OPEN AS POSSIBLE. ALL RESPONSES ARE ANONYNOUS 
SO THA'r CONFIDENTIALITY IS ENSURED. 
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APPENDIX Al contd . 
• Mo<t,ical . Negative · ( "'. '"c 1' de' nt) · ·' · - ...... scena.r.1.o 
SCENARIO 
UlAGINE THE FOLLOWING 
EVENTS: 
OUTCOME: 
Walking across the road on the way to visit a friend 
you are hit by a car, and rushed to hospital by 
ambulance. Doctors tell you that as well as minor 
cuts you have spinal injuries, but they envisage a 
complete recovery soon. 
Unexpected complications arise and it becomes 
evident that you will lose all use of your legs. 
You will not walk again. 
The abov~ EVENTS and OUTCOME have happened to you .•. 
TASK - List what goes through your mind with regard to the 
EVENTS and OUTCOME •.• 
[ye;tJfS : ·-
f<eii&JeC/ 
OUTtCMc·· 
e{' ckd 
w~ do 
L:.:. lrtis 
t2esenJ mertf 
so:11eJ(~i~ 
Ctrrtte /ic tt.h'(;vl$ 
Pur~ c{ 
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APPUIDIX A1 contd. 
Medical Positive (cancer) scenario 
SCENARIO 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING 
EVENTS: 
OUTCOME: 
Your doctor has referred you to a general hospital for 
tests, after you complained of stomach pains. The 
tests reveal you have a fast growing, life threatening 
cancer. Doctors are not sure whether you will 
survive, but say that whether the cancer is terminal 
or not depends on how your condition progresses· in 
the next few weeks .•. 
After two months your condition worsens and things 
do not look good for you. 
By the third month the cancer begins to remit. 
You soon regain your strength and prospects for 
a healthy future are now fine. 
The above EVENTS and OUTCOME have happened to you .•• 
TASK - List what goes through your mind with regard to the 
EVENT and OUTCOME .•. 
f:.\f~IJTS ·. w;11 I k ]1-t \y Sct>Jeoi 
·rJ har lies (.¥) 111-t.. of~ e) .:;;·;·de. . 
Is G-od about +o bJte. Vl'IL k 
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0 ' 
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APPEJ:'IDIX Al contd. 
Emotional Negative (results) scenario 
SCENARIO 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING 
EVENTS: 
OUTCOME: 
Your university results have been worse than 
expected so far, and you must improve considerably 
in the third term to pass any courses. On starting 
the third term you feel more refreshed and are 
optimistic you can pass all courses if exams go 
well. .. 
A week before final exams you become v,ery anxious 
and depressed so decide to withdraw from university. 
You miss the final exams. Your depression deepens 
and you are ill for five months afterwards. 
The above EVENTS and OUTCOME have happened to you ••. 
TASK - List what goes through your mind with regard to the 
EVENTS and OUTCOME ..• 
O.tkGY~U:- :P!'d 
bdk.r 
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APPENDIX Al contd. 
Elnotional Positive (job) scenario 
SCENARIO 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING 
EVENTS: 
OU'l'COME: 
You lose your part-time job and try for several 
others but are not accepted for any. Without 
money from a part-time job you cannot stay at 
university. You feel trapped and discouraged, 
and your self esteem plummets. You feel on 
the verge of a nervous breakdown •••• 
Two v1eeks later your confidence improves and 
your outlook becomes more positive. Soon after 
you are hired in a suitable part-time job and 
feel happy and in control. 
The above EVENTS and OUTCOME have happened to you •••• 
TASK - List what ~oes through your mind with regard to the 
EVENTS and OUTCO!-lE ••• 
fver\h::.- Wf Lt cloe5 fht- /w-L held Wl hteuJ- 11 ~~~ 
D,!)e~ 6q;{ hMt o. elc141 - ~-~ ~t <...- r~ He~ 
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1\PPEI:<IDIX Al contd. 
Interpersonal Negative (parerrts) scenario 
SCENARIO 
I~~GINE THE FOLLOWING 
EVENTS: 
OUTCOME: 
You love both your parents. Although they have 
not always been happy together the family unit 
is very important to you. 
This year your parents appear to get on better 
and you feel much happier in the home environment. 
Your parents' relationship starts to disintegrate 
as heated arguments break out. Any trust between 
your parents is lost as your mother accuses your 
father of sleeping with another woman, and files 
for divorce. Both parents are very bitter towards 
each other. 
The above EVENTS and OUTCOME have happened to you •.. 
TASK - List ~That goes through your mind with regard to the 
EVENTS and OUTCOME ..• 
E \J<?Jth·· No+- tJc{Jl,ilv~ abc·df ?atet-tJs i2~1£thMs, ~'P-
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APPENDIX Al contd. 
Interpersonal positive (fiance/e) scenario 
SCENARIO 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING 
EVENTS: 
OUTCOME: 
The person you are engaged to, and hope to marry 
soon has recently become unsure of their feelings 
towards you, so decides to go on a three week 
holiday in Australia to help sort out these feelings •.• 
You have not received any cards or telephone calls 
from Australia after one week and begin to suspect 
your loved one no longer cares for you ••• 
The next day your fiance/e unexpectedly returns 
saying t:hat they missed you so much, and want to· 
marry earlier than planned. 
The above EVENTS and OUTCOME have happened to you •.. 
TASK - List what goes through your mind with regard to the 
EVENTS and OUTCOME •.• 
EveNT<;·. ~ow ir-l~'(\ 1 deUde.. whtHw Sh-e~ 
tecdly ioves. me_ o/' not 1. 
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APPENDIX A 2. _9uestionnaire - Forced choice task 
(Part 2) ccmpleted by subject 44 
Thesis for M.Sc in Psychology Peter Van Dijk 
FOLLOW-UP 
This questionnaire contains some follow-up questions to the 
scenario exercise completed. 
1 ' 
Please rate all possible causes (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) 1 (f) 
on the scales provided by circling the position of your choice 
for every scale. 
Here is an example:-
SCENARIO ..•• 
EVENTS .•• 
OUTCOME .• 
To what extent would the OUTCOME of the· 
scenario be caused by 
Not at 
all 
(a) you (the central 
character) ; 
(b) luck; 
(c) fate; 
(d) God; 
(e) Other peop'le 
(whether in 
scenario or not) 
(f) Devil; 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Very 
slight 
extent 
2 ' 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Slight Moderate Great 
Extent extent extent 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
Very 
great 
extent 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
If for example you think that you (the central character of the 
scenario) caused the OUTCQ.t.1E to a slight extent 1 then circle 
position 3 on the scale next to "(a) you (the central characterY·. 
If you also think luck caused the OUTCQ1.1E to a great extent, 
then circle position 5 on the scale next to ''(b) luck:" etc. 
Rate all causes (a) to (f), 
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SCENARIO 
EVENTS: 
3, 
IHAGINE THE FOLLO~IING -
Walking across the road on the way to visit a friend you 
are hit by a car, and rushed to hospital by ambulance. 
Doctors tell you that as well as minor cuts you have 
spinal injuries, but they envisage a complete recovery 
soon. 
OUTCO~ffi: Unexpected complications arise and it becomes evident 
that you will lose all use of your legs. You will not 
walk agn.il'. 
To what extent would the OUTCONE of the scenario be caused by: 
Not at Very Slight Moderate Great 
(a) you (the central all slight extent extent extent 
Very great 
extent 
charact~r) ;+1--~e~x~~~~----+---
(b) luck; 
(c) fate; 
(d) God; 
(e) other people {whether in 
scenario or not); 
(f) Devil; 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
1 2 3 
4 5 6 
4 5 6 
4 5 6 
4 5 6 
5 6 
4 5 6 
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SCENARIO 
EVENTS: 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING -
Your doctor has referred you to a general hospital for 
tests, after you complained of stomach pains. The 
tests reveal you have a fast growing, life threatening 
cancer. Doctors are not sure whether you will survive, 
but say that wehther the cancer is terminal or not 
depends on how your condition progresses in the 
next few weeks ... 
After two months your condition worsens and things do 
not look good for you. 
OUTCOt-IE: By the third month the cancer begins to remit. You soon 
regain your strength and prospects for a healthy future 
are now fine. 
To what extent would the OUTCOME of the scenario be caused by: 
6. 
Not at Very Slight Moderate Great Very great 
all slight extent extent extent extent 
(a) (the central character) ; I extent you I CD 
(b) luck; 
(c) fate; 
(d) God; 
(e) other people (whether in 
scenario or not); 
(f) Devil; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
CD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
~--~--~--~--~-ED 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
CD'----+--+----+---t---J-
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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:>. 
SCENARIO 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING -
EVENTS: Your university results have been worse than expected so 
far, and you must improve considerably in the third term 
to pass any courses. On starting the third term you feel 
more refreshed and are optimistic you can pass all courses 
if exams go well ... 
OUTCO~ffi: A week before final exams you become very anxious and 
depressed so decide to withdraw from university. You miss 
the final exams. Your depression deepens and you are ill 
for five months aftenmrdn. 
To what extent would the OUTCO~ of the scenario be caused by: 
Not at Very Slight Moderate Great Very great 
all slight extent extent extent extent (a) you (the central character); I extelljt CD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(b) luck; ® 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(c) fate; CD 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(d) God; @d 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(e) other people (whether in 
scenario or not); 4} 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(f) Devil; (i) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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SCENARIO 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING -
EVENTS: You lose your part-time job and try for several others but 
are not accepted for any. Without money from a part-time 
job you cannot stay at university. You feel trapped and 
discouraged, and your self esteem plummets. You feel on 
the verge of a nervous breakdown ..• 
OUTCOME: Two weeks later your confidence improves and your outlook 
becomes more positive. Soon after you are hired in a 
suitable part-time job and feel happy and in control. 
To what extent would the OUTCOME of the scenario be 
Not at Very Slight Hoderate Great Very great 
all slight extent extent extent extent 
(a) you (the central character) ;t- extent /.""1 --41---+--~--~~tt/ 
(b) luck; 
(c) fate; 
(d) God; 
(e) other people (whether in 
scenario or not); 
(f) Devil; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
@--+-~---r--+-~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
CD~+-~---r--+-~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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SCENARIO 
EVENTS: 
I~~GINE THE FOLLOWING -
You love both your parents. Although they have not always 
been happy together the family unit is very important to you. 
This year your parents appear to get on better and you 
feel much happier in the horne environment. 
OU'rCOME: Your parents' relations~~p starts to disintegrate as 
heated arguments break out. Any trust bet\•/een your 
parents is lost as your mother accuses your father of 
sleeping with another woman, and files for divorce. 
Both parents are very bitter toward~ each other. 
To what extent would the OUTCOME of the scenar~o be caused by: 
Very 
Not at slight Slight Moderate Great Very gre<.t"-
(a) you {the central A 1 extent extent ext.ent extent exteat 
character) ~~----r------+------~lr---·---r------T 
(b) luck; 
(c) fate; 
(d) God; 
(e) other people (whether in 
scenario or not) ; 
(f) Devil; 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
ffir---r---r--~--,_--~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
@r-~--+-~---r--~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
~--~--r----r-~---6) 
l 2 3 4 5 6 
r-~---r--~--+-~~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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SCENARIO 
EVENTS: 
OUTCOME: 
7. 
IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING -
The person you are engaged to, and·hope to marry soon has 
recently become unsure of their feelings towards you, so 
decides to go on a three week holiday in Australia to 
help sort out these feelings •.• 
You have not received any cards or telephone calls from 
Australia after one week and begin to suspect your loved 
one no longer cares for you .•. 
The next day your fiance/e unexpectedly returns saying 
that they missed you so much, and want to marry earlier 
than planned. 
To what extent would the OUTCOME of the scenario be caused by: 
Not at Very Slight Moderate Great Very great 
all slight extent extent extent extent 
(a) you (the central character); I extent ED' 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(b) luck; $--~--~--+-~r-~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(c) fate; ~~~--4---+---r-~ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(d) God; @ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(e) other people (whether in 
scenario or not) ; (l) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(f) Devil; (1) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
129 
APPEIDIX A3. Questionnaire - Religious scalE~s 
(Part 3) completed by subject 44 
/)o fh,j -third. 
Peter Van Dijk 
M.Sc Psychology Thesis Questionnaire g 
The aim of this last section is to find out about people's 
approach to religion, and their conception of God. 
Where scales are provided, please circle one of the seven 
positions on the scale that best represents your view, or 
answers the question best. 
Please answer all questions. I hope you find them interesting. 
1. I think it is more important to go to church 
than to be active in politics. 
Circle number on scal·e ~--~c;J4-~~3-----4~--~5----+6----+7 
strongly strongl) 
agree disagreE 
2. We all have been taught the Ten Commandments and we know of 
other scriptural statements concerning what we should do. 
Which of the following statements comes closest to your 
feeling about the Commandments? 
Tick beside the 
statement of your 
choice. 
·D (a) The Commandments are to be followed because 
they are rules that God has given us in order 
to lead Christian lives. 
~b} The Commandments are to be followed because they 
give us a general idea how to live, but we must 
interpret them ourselves to fit the situation. 
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3. 
4. 
Would you tell me whether you think drinking alcohol is 
Circle number c9 on scale 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never Always 
wrong wrong 
Here are four statements which have been made about the Bible. 
Which is closest to your view? 
Tick beside the ~a) The Bible is God's Word and all 
statement of it says is true. 
your choice, 0 
0 
(b) The Bible is a valuable book because 
it is written by wise and good men 
who were inspired by God, and its 
basic moral and religious teachings 
are true, but because the writers 
were men it contains some human 
errors. 
(c) The Bible is a valuable book because 
it was written by wise and good men 
but God had nothing to do with it. 
0 (d) The Bible was written by men who lived 
so long ago it is of little value 
today. 
5. How do you feel apout this statement? 
Testifying about one's religious experience should be part 
of regular church services. 
Circle number 
on scale 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 5 
undecided 
6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
6. God sends misfortune and illness on people as punishment for 
sins. 
Circle number 
on scale 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
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7. How often do you pray privately in places other than at church? 
Circle number (iJ 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never frequently 
a. How often do you ask God to forgive your sin? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never frequently 
9. Private prayer is one of the most important and satisfying 
aspects of my religious experience. 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
10. Through prayer, if you sincerely ask God to help you, how 
often will God help you? 
1 2 3 
never 
4 5 6 7 
frequently 
11. When you have decisions to make in your everyday life, how 
often do you try to find out what God wants you to do? 
1 2 3 
never 
4 5 6 7 
frequently 
12. I frequently feel very close to God in prayer, during public 
worship or at important moments in my life. 
(}-+-----1--1--t----1----+ 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
132 
13. My religious beliefs are what really underlies my 'IThole 
approach to life. 
Circle number 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
14. I try hard to grow in understanding of what it means to live 
as a child of God. 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 5 
undecided 
15. I try hard to carry my religion over int.o all my 
dealings in life. 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 5 
undecided 
6 
6 
7 
strongly 
disagree 
7 
strongly 
disagree 
16. God sees to it that everything that happens to me, even the 
bad things will turn out for the best eventually. 
(9~-----· +----+---+----+--+---t-
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
17. God makes sure that my problems will work out. 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 
5 
6 
6 
7 
strongly 
disagree 
7 
strongly 
disagree 
18. God has a plan for this world and everything that happens to us, 
Pven the suffering we sometimes endure is part of God's plan. 
~~~·--4----+--~~--+---~--~--
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
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19. How often does. God influence personal events in your life? 
Circle number (f) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Never frequently 
20. How do you think God influences events in your own life? 
Below are some possible explanations. Answer all four. 
(a) God directly intervenes; 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 ''\ 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
(b) God gives me signs so that I may make the choice God 
wants me to make. 
·I £J) 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
(c) God's \'lord helps me to make the right choices at 
important moments in my life. 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 6 7 
strongly 
disagree 
(d) God's predestined plan determines the outcome of all 
events. 
1 
strongly 
agree 
2 3 4 
undecided 
5 
strongly 
disagree 
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If you have a different understanding of how God influences your 
life than any of the four views above, briefly write your 
understanding below. 
6. 
&eel dave· Mti;1~Fte-«<6Wt ol: Cio/te t!IJoof ;1;~/j€,/!i/e 
5-::> u<Jz./ t:'Ur1 dec.it!e wt1cl!ttt/ 4 mttie q c/k.sd'si~VI 
Yoa/,Je)f - av- lc !td 6ccl clo i I )c;- voc( . 
' 
13!3 
(/, 
Host people have an image of God. An image of God contains 
the characterYstics a rerson attributes to God - what they think 
God is like. Please indicate your own image of God 
by completing the task below. · 
Below are 34 adjectives. Rate each adjective by indicating 
how well it describes your own view of God. ~ircle the 
position of your choice for each adjective. 
ADJECTIVES 
loving 
distant 
infinite 
avenging 
familiar 
here 
all powerful 
clear 
warm 
inaccessible 
gentle 
near 
all seeing 
alive 
protective 
punishing 
helpful 
merciful 
kind 
damning 
personal 
passive 
wrathful 
charitable 
redeeming 
comforting 
forgiving 
severe 
strong 
obvious 
meaningful 
hard 
stern 
Describes Very Well Moderately Poorly 
God well 
perfectly 
Very 
Poorly 
Doesn't 
describe 
God at 
all 
7 
----+-----~---+----+---~-----+--
2. 4 .6 3 s 
cp 
dJ : : : : 
(}2 I I I I 
! i 
~. : : 
{f) I f I I I I 
1! ! r! ! ! 
I I I I I I ([) 
! 
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Sex? @ 0 
What church denomination do you belong to? (if any) 
C/+1HOLIC-
Any comments about the questionnaire you wish to make. 
Be it\,~ a Ch 1\·s:kt iV\ 
bei~ f<e l1.31 ouS;,, .A 
be I i e-Ve>s c-IvtOi pt Ci d; ces 
is not exac+-ly 
(2. e i i 8 1 oi.l s pe-l c.;. <J"'Yl 
fvv h,' wtse.l f- ( se! f,·s.idy }, 
C{ /Me . Out::JQ\vt, be I rues. s-=.) 1--hc:tf- o H, eJ .s 
11wy b.e..lie.;t av~c.t t.Je.- saved. . 
PLEASE CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL QUESTIONS 
Thankyou for your time and co-operation. 
co 
("V") 
r-1 
APPENDIX B Thought Listing Coding Foms (1) & (2) for subject 44 
(l) 
•' 
;. A IIR..ii3 upoNS TOF~~~i3~TioiJ5 To --4/.r Q i..iE51iOI'V5 ~ C-oHPL<=-.X A TTiZt D UT/ONS TO i · 4TT<,a.,cj 
C.o 1.JCE R.JV ii\lCr , C.h-USP>'- i c.-o ~) H AA.ID O THE-fZS S;Q_r'- , I 7<:> i....t.JC.K 5 CC.IVAK.. iO i 
cAuse:. I TH 11.J i<. uJ &- l ,. m_.pi-ed sfafed { ;w~p/,- ed sl-afed (i'>'/f'/,'ed :;l:al:ed ; . .,p(, ~d J.f-a.~d.. I I 
o. u ·;ct e:t+ s..o 61) 7 0 i I ~ A-rA.:-l I I I i I { (). +(.6.""- /E.. ito I ~ i i i I I I I I I I I I co>"~c.er 7 EvV~+ i 13£ So ?£ 3E I I I· ' I 
I results I )A-r'J i I 4.D 5oto7o I L;Jo 'f.o .o IE 7o I .. I 
I ; I job 2;6: l)o I I I I I 
I pare..nts ' I 
I 
I ~,£ 7 Mco . ...e. I :3 6 I I l I I _..j:i 0. A <-~/e. I 4~ ft., £ ~€ J,c 4,5 3v I I 
(2} 
'--.--
I f+.TT~Ii3CATtOJ...l5 TO li A. TTP...iounoft/S ro A7TR..Ji31..J/IDIV5 TO I ATTRii3UTtoA.Ji To ] ASKOJ(;- G-<JD l/-1/tN K t/I.J & F!ittH C'~ 
(i-OD'S H..4ND (ro o'J CONi7WL .. \ G00'5 PLA_N~ P...KPoJ£1 G-OO's Wtt...L fOR.. ti£t..P · CroO IZELft TlOJJ5t-ttP SC£1VAK.t0 I 
eod'>tb...t fe,.fo-h~ co.rf;cLe.r,.t f-edr.,.f,;;e : cvd:de/l.f fe-ln-6:.e i cc.vrhcf;,.,;f fe/lk·ft~ in-.f'kecl ofafed c-f'ked 'Ofof<>cf 1'"f".ed sroi<Ed 
}.6 i i c 0 I I acc.iden+ i-:~ I lo I ' I l I j !s-o I CO.A c.e.r ro 3E. 1£ Lflc I r- 4 a I I I I I l I I r.esu.!+s ' SttrfiN'j I !: tJ __kt> i 
1- I 
i I I I I jOb ~E -~ 45-1 0 i I I 
I 
I I i po.,....e .. f\.+$ <) I _Zo I v£ 
I i ~G I l i :< I ~raAc.e;e '7 I I ~; E I v;& ., 
AiTRd3u·nc.vS 
/o Fllr<E 
i""'fl•eJ sfcc{a:l 
I 
I 
I 
-
' 
C-oo:S 
/Z..c.4SoNS 
,..,~r.eJ sf.c..f.eo/ 
f:o 
I go 
I ' 
J 
! 
I 
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APPENDIX C 
ATTRIBUTIONS TO GOD CORRELATED WITH THE RELIGIOUS SCALES 
RELIGIOUS SCALES (1) TOTAL SPONTANEOUS 
GOD ATTRIBUTION 
Sectarianism .357 *** 
Devotional ism .455 **** 
Salience: Cognition .481 **** 
Religious Comfort .476 **** 
Control of God by Prayer .452 *** 
Q1 -Frequency of God's Influence .461 **** 
Q2 -God's Direct Intervention .406 *** 
Q3 -God's Influence by Signs .333 ** 
Q4 -God's Influence through 
The Bible .416 *** 
Q5 -God's Influence through 
predetermination of all events n.s 
(2)TOTAL FORCED CHOICE 
GOD ATTRIBUTION 
.559 **** 
.633 **** 
.616 **** 
.681 **** 
.470 **** 
.721 ***** 
. 714 ***** 
.573 **** 
.682 **** 
.217 ** 
* p . 05, ** p =.01, *** p =.001, **** p =.0001, ***** p <.00001 
APPENDIX D. 
(1)&(2) M11ltivariate Anal;x:sis of Vgriance Summgr;x: Table fQr God 
At:t;ril;mtion 
(l)Spontaneous (2)Forced Choice 
God At:t;rib1!tion God Attribution 
Pilla is df F Pillais df F 
Source value value 
Sex 1 0.01 1 .23 
Age 1 1.16 1 .16 
Valence 2 28.78**** 1 69.41**** 
Domain 0.22 2 9.21*** 
Domain :x 0.16 2 6.18** 
Valence 
(3) Multivariate Analysis of Variance 
Summary Table for Devil A:t;:t;ribu:t;ion 
(3)Forced Choice Devil Attribution 
Pallais df F 
Source value 
Valence 1 56.3**** 
Domain 0.37 2 17.1**** 
Domain :x 
Valence 0.30 2 12.6**** 
p: * .05, ** .01, *** .001, **** 
0.20 2 7.55*** 
0.09 2 3.14* 
.0001 
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